Wickramaratna v Cambridge University Chemistry Department

A limited civil restraint order is a regulatory direction protecting the court process from abuse. It controls the issue of further applications by requiring permission; it does not prohibit a person from acting and is therefore distinct from an injunction. A High Court Master may make such an order despite restrictions governing injunctions. The ruling is confined to the limited form and does not determine jurisdiction for more stringent orders. A litigant cannot insist that an application be heard by a judge of a chosen level. The appeal was dismissed.

The claimant sought injunctions concerning a disputed postgraduate studentship. Her High Court claim was struck out by Master Fontaine under CPR 3.4, and she was barred from making further applications without permission. MacKay J refused to entertain a renewed application to set aside that order, holding that permission was required. Rix LJ granted permission to appeal only on whether a High Court Master had jurisdiction to make a civil restraint order. The central issue was whether a limited civil restraint order was an injunction subject to the restrictions in the Practice Direction to Part 2.

The Court of Appeal unanimously dismissed the appeal.

1. Nature of the order. A limited civil restraint order, formerly known as a Grepe v Loam order, protects the court’s process from abuse. It operates by directing the court office not to issue further applications in the relevant proceedings without permission. It is therefore materially different from an injunction, which regulates a person’s conduct. The injunction restrictions in the Practice Direction to Part 2 did not govern the order.
2. Jurisdiction. The judgment applied the reasoning in Bhamjee v Forsdick (No 2) [2003] EWCA Civ 1113, also reported at [2004] 1 WLR 88. A High Court Master had jurisdiction to make a limited civil restraint order. The court confined its conclusion to that form of order and did not determine the jurisdiction to make the more stringent forms now addressed by Practice Direction 3C of Part 3.
3. Notice and absence. Legal Aid Board v Adshead (CAT 26th November 1999) did not impose an inflexible rule that notice must always precede a civil restraint order. In a case involving persistent vexatious applications, a Master might consider it necessary to act without notice to prevent further costs. Nevertheless, where an order is made in a litigant’s absence because of illness, it is preferable to state expressly that the litigant has liberty to apply to set it aside. Here, the claimant had ample opportunity to challenge both the strike-out and restraint order, but withdrew the relevant application.
4. Choice of judicial level. A litigant cannot insist that an application be heard at a particular level of court or by a judge of her choice. Having withdrawn the application that was properly before Master Fontaine, the claimant could not require the issue to be renewed before a High Court judge. The formal order required payment of £3,000 on account of the respondent’s costs, with any further costs application to detailed assessment.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division) On 2 November 2004, Brooke LJ, Jonathan Parker LJ and Keene LJ dismissed the appeal. Permission had been limited by Rix LJ to the jurisdiction of a High Court Master to make a civil restraint order.
• High Court, Queen’s Bench Division MacKay J refused on 8 March 2004 to set aside or entertain the claimant’s renewed challenge to Master Fontaine’s order of 9 October 2003.