Ahmad v Inland Revenue

On a second appeal, permission requires an important point of principle or practice or another compelling reason. That threshold applies to the decision actually under appeal. A proposed appeal against refusal to extend time may be refused where success would serve no sensible purpose, including because the underlying challenge is bound to fail and a fresh bankruptcy order would follow. The court may consider the practical consequences of granting an extension. A potentially important issue about the effect of a pending appeal on a statutory demand did not justify permission where the application concerned only refusal to extend time and the delay was unexplained.

The applicant, a bankrupt, sought permission to bring a second appeal from Evans-Lombe J’s dismissal of an appeal against a registrar’s refusal to extend time for filing an appellant’s notice. The underlying proceedings concerned a statutory demand for tax liabilities, a bankruptcy petition and an application to annul the bankruptcy order. The proposed underlying appeal raised the effect of a pending appeal against refusal to set aside the statutory demand and the applicability of limitation legislation to tax claims. The central issue was whether the refusal to extend time raised an important point of principle or practice, or another compelling reason for a second appeal.

The application for permission to appeal was refused. The proposed appeal was from the refusal to extend time, not directly from the order refusing to annul the bankruptcy or from the bankruptcy order itself.

1. Under CPR 52.13, the Court of Appeal could not grant permission for a second appeal unless it raised an important point of principle or practice, or there was another compelling reason to entertain it.
2. The court had a discretion to refuse an extension of time where allowing the appeal would serve no sensible purpose. The principle in Re Noble (A Bankrupt) [1965] Ch 129 applied even where the proposed appeal would otherwise succeed, if the practical consequence would merely be a fresh bankruptcy petition and another bankruptcy order.
3. The proposed limitation challenge was hopeless because section 37(2) of the Limitation Act 1980 excluded claims for tax of any kind. Extending time would therefore lead only to a further bankruptcy order on the existing demand.
4. Chadwick LJ considered that, had the appeal against refusal to annul been brought in time, the effect of section 267(2)(d) of the Insolvency Act 1986, where a refusal to set aside a statutory demand remained under appeal, would have raised an important point of principle. That issue was not determinative of the present application.
5. The refusal to extend time raised no important point of principle and there was no other compelling reason for a second appeal. Application refused. No order as to costs.

1. Court of Appeal (Civil Division) — On 1 December 2004, Chadwick LJ refused permission for a second appeal from Evans-Lombe J’s decision.
2. High Court (Chancery Division) — On 23 July 2004, Evans-Lombe J dismissed the appeal against Mr Registrar Jacques’s refusal on 5 February 2004 to extend time for filing an appellant’s notice.
3. High Court (Chancery Division) — On 4 February 2003, Mr Registrar Jacques dismissed the application to annul the bankruptcy order.
4. Croydon County Court — On 18 June 2002, Deputy District Judge Armstrong dismissed the application to set aside the statutory demand.