Healy v Corporation of Lloyds

Procedural unfairness is not established merely because a litigant in person conducts a trial less effectively than a represented opponent. The court must identify a procedural defect attributable to the judge. Fresh medical evidence obtained after trial may be excluded under the Ladd v Marshall principles, and the judge may decline to consider it when handing down judgment. A party who says that existing expert evidence requires clarification must make that request clearly at trial; it is not enough later to recast the complaint as one about the need for new evidence.

Lloyd's admitted liability for failing to provide an employee with the benefits of its permanent health insurance scheme. The High Court assessed damages at £148,418, allowing for the claimant's assumed ability to earn 50 per cent of her former earnings until age 55.

The claimant's solicitors withdrew shortly before the quantum trial. She proceeded in person and sought an adjournment to obtain further medical evidence. The application was refused. After receiving a draft judgment, she obtained a further report which concluded that she was unfit for work, but the judge refused permission to rely on it and did not consider it when handing down judgment.

Permission to appeal was granted on the alleged procedural failures in refusing the adjournment and excluding the later material. The central issue was whether the judge's conduct of the trial and refusal to consider the fresh report had been procedurally unfair.

1. Appeal dismissed. The permission granted by Chadwick LJ was properly understood as permitting an appeal against the substantive damages assessment on two procedural grounds: refusal of an adjournment for updated medical evidence and refusal to consider material submitted late.
2. No procedural defect was shown. The claimant had confirmed that she would proceed as a litigant in person and had not sought an adjournment to obtain alternative legal representation. The evidence indicated that her lack of representation resulted from her misunderstanding of the proper role of an expert. Her expert's primary duty was to the court, so he could not alter his opinion at her direction merely because she disagreed with it.
3. The judge was entitled to assess her as capable of conducting her own case. She had mastered the documents, conducted the trial competently and did not indicate at trial that she could not do so. Disadvantage arising from appearing without lawyers did not, without more, make the procedure unfair.
4. It was also appropriate to exclude the fresh medical report. The judge had ruled out further medical evidence on Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489 grounds, and could therefore decline to consider material that arrived only on the morning fixed for handing down judgment. The claimant had told the judge that new evidence was required, rather than asking for clarification of the existing evidence; she could not successfully recast that position on appeal.
5. The court noted an admitted error in the damages calculation: the judge had deducted both notional earnings and benefits although only one could be received. Lloyd's agreed to increase the damages by £7,727. The claimant was ordered to pay Lloyd's costs up to 27 January 2004, with no order as to costs thereafter.

• Court of Appeal (Civil Division): Appeal dismissed. The court treated the permitted grounds as challenging the refusal of an adjournment and the refusal to consider late material. Lloyd's agreed to increase the damages by £7,727 to correct an accounting error; costs were ordered up to 27 January 2004, with no order thereafter.
• High Court, Mercantile Court, Newcastle District Registry: His Honour Judge McGonigal assessed damages at £148,418 after Lloyd's had submitted to judgment on liability. He refused an adjournment, excluded the later medical report under the principles in Ladd v Marshall [1954] 1 WLR 1489, and refused permission to appeal.