Mason, R. v

Before sentence, a trial judge has a judicial discretion to permit a defendant to change an unequivocal guilty plea. The discretion requires an objective basis and is generally exercised sparingly. The central question is whether the plea was freely and genuinely made as an acknowledgement of guilt.

Later information may justify a change of plea if it negates, or objectively casts real doubt on, the factual basis or truth of the plea. A subsequent weakening of part of the prosecution evidence does not suffice where other evidence supported the charge and the defendant’s instructions were consistent with the basis on which the plea was entered.

The appellant pleaded guilty at Leeds Crown Court to manslaughter, as an alternative to murder, arising from a group attack in which the victim died. He later applied to vacate the plea, alleging that pressure from his advisers and co-defendants had deprived him of a free choice. Treacy J refused that application on 4 March 2003.

Before sentence, the Crown could not rely on its principal witness at a proposed Newton hearing because of matters arising after the plea. The judge sentenced the appellant without finding that he had personally kicked the victim, but again refused to permit withdrawal of the plea. The appeal concerned whether either refusal involved an erroneous exercise of discretion.

1. The appeal against conviction was dismissed. The appellant properly conceded that the first refusal, on 4 March 2003, disclosed no error of law, unfair consideration of the evidence, or unreasonable exercise of discretion.
2. A trial judge may permit a guilty plea to be changed before sentence, even if it is unequivocal. The discretion must be exercised judicially and needs an objective basis. It is generally exercised sparingly, particularly where the defendant has been advised by experienced counsel. A plea must also be freely made, because it is a public acknowledgement and confession of guilt.
3. An appellate court will not interfere with a refusal to permit withdrawal unless the judge misdirected himself, considered irrelevant matters, omitted relevant matters, or acted wholly unreasonably. The trial judge had investigated the alleged pressure fully and fairly. His findings that the appellant made an informed and voluntary choice, after firm but proper advice, were plainly open to him.
4. The later difficulty concerning the Crown witness did not invalidate the plea. The judge had not treated later material as irrelevant in principle. He correctly considered whether it negated, or objectively cast doubt on, the factual basis of the appellant’s admission that he participated in the unlawful joint attack.
5. It did not do so. The witness’s alleged misconduct arose after the plea, there had been no pre-plea non-disclosure, and the Crown retained CCTV, other witness evidence, and evidence connecting the appellant with the group attack. Although the Crown could not prove at the Newton hearing that he personally kicked the victim, that was consistent with sentencing him on the basis of his plea. It gave no objective reason to doubt either the plea’s voluntariness or its truth.

The appeal against sentence was to be dealt with after judgment.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the appeal against conviction. The appeal against sentence was deferred for later determination.
• Crown Court: Treacy J refused the appellant’s first application to vacate his guilty plea on 4 March 2003. On 16 June 2003, he again refused to vacate the plea and sentenced the appellant to four years’ imprisonment consecutive to an existing four-year term.
• Leeds Crown Court: The appellant pleaded guilty on 13 November 2002 to manslaughter as an alternative to murder.