Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern, R. v

Section 51 A of the Firearms Act 1968 imposes a five-year minimum custodial term on an adult convicted of a qualifying firearm offence unless there are exceptional circumstances relating to the offence or offender. A timely guilty plea does not permit a sentence below that minimum. Parliament's omission of an express guilty-plea saving was deliberate.

Where real exceptional circumstances are properly established, the sentence is at large under ordinary sentencing principles. The statutory minimum remains a relevant factor, together with applicable guidance and mitigation. Exceptional cases will be rare.

Three sentencing appeals concerning possession of prohibited firearms were heard together following the introduction of the minimum-sentence regime in section 51 A of the Firearms Act 1968.

Jordan and Alleyne had each pleaded guilty and received the statutory five-year term. They contended that credit for a guilty plea could reduce that term. Alleyne also argued that his asserted possession of the weapon for protection amounted to exceptional circumstances.

Redfern had received two and a half years after the sentencing judge found exceptional circumstances, but treated the five-year minimum as restricting the sentence that could then be imposed. The central issues were the effect of a guilty plea on the statutory minimum and the sentencing discretion which follows a proper finding of exceptional circumstances.

1. All three appeals were dismissed. Jordan and Alleyne had each received the five-year minimum. No exceptional circumstances were established in either case. Alleyne's account of possessing the gun to prevent its use against him did not meet the statutory threshold.
2. Guilty pleas do not reduce the statutory minimum. Section 51 A of the Firearms Act 1968 is plain and unambiguous. It requires an adult convicted of a qualifying offence to receive at least five years' custody unless exceptional circumstances justify a lower sentence. The court declined to use parliamentary debates. The statutory scheme showed that Parliament knew how to preserve a discount for a guilty plea in minimum-sentence regimes, but deliberately made no such provision in section 51 A. The possibility of exceptional circumstances is the statutory mitigation of its rigour.
3. The effect of exceptional circumstances. Once a judge has properly found real exceptional circumstances, the sentence is at large. The judge may still treat the five-year minimum as a relevant factor, but must also apply ordinary sentencing guidance, including R v Avis & Ors [1998] 1 Cr App R (S) 420, and all available mitigation, including good character and a timely guilty plea. Such cases will be rare.
4. Redfern. The sentencing judge had been wrong to regard the five-year minimum as a continuing constraint after finding exceptional circumstances. However, the Court of Appeal considered that the facts came nowhere near justifying a suspended sentence and doubted that Redfern's belief that the weapon was a replica could amount to exceptional circumstances. As the Attorney General had not intervened, the court could not increase the sentence. It was not persuaded to reduce the sentence of two and a half years.

The court also refused to certify a question for the House of Lords.

• Court of Appeal (Criminal Division): Dismissed the sentencing appeals of Jordan, Alleyne and Redfern.
• Crown Court: Jordan was sentenced at Leicester Crown Court; Alleyne was sentenced at Woolwich Crown Court following committal for sentence; and Redfern was sentenced at Kingston-upon-Thames Crown Court.