DPP v Janman

A person factually supervising a learner driver may be in charge of the vehicle for the purposes of section 5(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988, even if that person is not statutorily qualified to supervise. More than one person may be in charge. The supervisor may still rely on the section 5(2) defence, but whether there was no likelihood of driving is a question of fact. Driving includes taking control of steering or other controls, or directing the learner’s control in circumstances where the direction would reasonably be followed. Ordinarily, the learner’s alleged competence will not establish the defence because the statutory requirement for supervision reflects that the learner is not yet regarded as competent to drive alone.

The DPP appealed by case stated from the dismissal of an information against a passenger who had consumed alcohol above the prescribed limit and had been supervising his partner, a provisional licence holder, while she drove. The magistrates held that the prosecution had not proved that he was qualified to supervise, that he was in charge, or that the section 5(2) defence had been rebutted. The central issues were whether factual supervision required proof of statutory qualification, whether supervision made the respondent in charge, and whether the evidence established no likelihood that he would drive.

1. Appeal allowed. The case was remitted to the justices with a direction to convict.
2. The magistrates were wrong to require proof that the respondent was qualified under regulation 17 of the Motor Vehicles (Driving Licences) Regulations 1999. If a provisional licence holder is driving and another person is factually performing the function of supervision, that person is the supervisor for the purposes of the issue before the court. Statutory disqualification from supervising might create another offence, but it does not determine whether the person was supervising.
3. In normal circumstances, the person supervising a provisional licence holder is in charge of the vehicle under section 5(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. It is possible for more than one person to be in charge. The supervisor’s status as a person in charge does not prevent reliance on section 5(2).
4. Once the respondent raised the defence, the prosecution had to address whether there was no likelihood of his driving. That issue is factual. Driving may include taking sole control, operating controls, or directing the learner’s control where the learner could reasonably be expected to follow the instruction. The reasoning in Langman v Valentine and Williamson v Crow supported that approach.
5. Sheldon v Jones did not decide whether a supervisor was in charge, but it recognised that a supervisor might establish the statutory defence on particular facts. The respondent’s only basis was that his partner was a competent driver. That was insufficient: absent extraordinary facts, the learner’s competence does not establish that there was no likelihood of the supervisor taking control.

• Magistrates’ Court: The information was dismissed after the justices found that supervision, statutory qualification, being in charge, and the section 5(2) defence had not been established in the prosecution’s favour.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by case stated was allowed. The matter was remitted to the justices with a direction to convict.