H v H

In ancillary-relief proceedings involving substantial assets held in family trusts, fairness under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 does not require equal division where the wealth derives principally from a third-party settlor. The award may instead be confined to the applicant’s needs and the other spouse’s ability to pay, viewed realistically through the trust structure. The court must respect trustees’ discretion and must not exert improper pressure. It may, however, frame orders that provide judicious encouragement where assistance is probable and the interests of other beneficiaries will not be appreciably damaged. Trust resources may properly meet a beneficiary child’s present maintenance, educational and therapeutic needs. Housing provision may appropriately be secured through a life-interest settlement where the assets originated from the other spouse’s family trust.

The wife applied for full ancillary relief following the breakdown of a marriage lasting approximately six years, including pre-marital cohabitation. The parties had one child with complex developmental and behavioural difficulties. Most of the family wealth was held in two offshore trusts established by the husband’s father. The issues included the wife’s housing and income needs, the husband’s capital and income resources, the extent to which trust resources could be treated as available, and whether provision for the child should be sought from the grandchildren’s settlement.

1. Statutory approach. The court applied sections 23, 24 and 25 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973. Fairness required consideration of all the statutory factors without discrimination between the money-earner and the home-maker or child-carer. Because the wealth derived principally from the husband’s father and was held in trust, equal sharing was inappropriate. The wife’s award was therefore confined by her needs and the husband’s ability to pay, assessed in the context of the trust arrangements.
2. Trust resources and judicial encouragement. The court applied the principles in Thomas v Thomas. It could not invade trust rights, usurp trustees’ discretion or impose improper pressure. It could nevertheless assess the reality of the parties’ access to wealth and frame orders that afforded judicious encouragement to the husband to seek assistance from the trustees. That approach was justified because the evidence showed that assistance was probable and the interests of the other beneficiaries would not be appreciably damaged.
3. Provision for the child. The grandchildren’s settlement could and should fund the child’s therapeutic intervention, parental support and mediation, nanny and additional tuition. Such payments were for the child’s benefit and could properly relieve the husband of corresponding expenditure. The court relied on Fuller v Evans 2000 1AER 636.
4. Relief granted. The wife was to receive a housing fund of £575,000 in a life-interest settlement, together with £55,000 free capital. The settlement was justified by the origin of the funds, the parties’ previous occupation of trust property, the relationship’s duration and the wife’s continuing responsibilities for the child. The court also assessed ongoing income provision and expected the trustees to make the necessary funds available.