M & Anor, R (on the application of) v West London Youth Court

A child or young person under 15 should generally be tried in the Youth Court. Committal to the Crown Court is justified only where there is a real prospect that, on conviction, custody of or approaching two years may be required, or where an unusual feature makes a shorter custodial sentence under section 91 appropriate. The offender’s ineligibility for a detention and training order, because he is under 15 and not a persistent offender, is not itself such an unusual feature. The assessment must account for age, character, role, plea and other sentencing factors. The statutory policy against custodial sentences for such young offenders must not be diluted by the seriousness of ordinary aggravating features.

Two 14-year-old claimants challenged a West London Youth Court decision committing them to the Crown Court for trial on a joint-enterprise robbery allegation. The alleged robbery involved a large group, the removal of a mobile telephone and other property, and violence, including the use of a crutch.

The district judge considered that the Crown Court might impose a sentence within the section 91 range. The claimants argued that, because they were of previous good character and neither was a persistent offender, the case was unsuitable for Crown Court trial. The central issue was whether the statutory threshold for committal had been met.

1. Permission and outcome. Permission was granted to W. The committal decisions concerning both M and W were quashed.
2. Under section 24(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, a person under 18 should ordinarily be tried summarily unless the statutory conditions for Crown Court trial are satisfied. The relevant condition required the Youth Court to consider that, if convicted, it ought to be possible to sentence the offender under section 91(3) of the Powers of Criminal Court (Sentencing) Act 2000.
3. Sections 100(1) and 100(2) of the 2000 Act show a legislative policy that children under 15 should not ordinarily receive custodial sentences. A child under 15 cannot receive a detention and training order unless he is a persistent offender. That lack of eligibility does not, by itself, justify committal for a shorter custodial sentence under section 91.
4. The proper inquiry was whether there was a real prospect that custody of, or approaching, two years might be required, or whether an unusual feature justified a sentence of less than two years under section 91(3). The seriousness of the alleged offence remained relevant, but the court had to consider the claimants’ ages, previous good character, individual roles, plea and likely mitigation.
5. The guidance on adult robbery sentencing in Attorney General's Reference Numbers 4 and 7 of 2002, R v Lobban and Sawyers did not impose an absolute starting point of 18 months for offenders under 15. The approach had to remain consistent with the special statutory treatment of young offenders.
6. Taking the prosecution case at its highest, neither claimant faced a real possibility of a sentence of or approaching two years. The group size was insufficient to constitute the required unusual feature. The district judge had therefore erred in concluding that the case was appropriate only for Crown Court trial.
7. The court noted that any perceived defect in the statutory scheme was for Parliament to remedy. Costs were ordered from central funds: M’s costs generally, and W’s costs limited to preparation of and application for permission, subject to detailed assessment.

First-instance judicial review in the Administrative Court. The judgment itself records the challenged decisions of the West London Youth Court but no earlier appellate decision in this litigation.