Begum, R (on the application of) v Denbigh High School

A school’s requirement that pupils comply with a published uniform policy does not amount to exclusion merely because a pupil chooses not to attend unless permitted to wear different clothing. A refusal motivated by religious belief is not necessarily an interference with the right to manifest religion where the pupil is required to comply with a neutral rule rather than being targeted because of the belief. A uniform policy may limit religious manifestation under Article 9(2) where it is prescribed by law, pursues the legitimate aim of protecting the rights and freedoms of others, and is proportionate. The policy may accommodate religious dress without accepting every individual interpretation of religious requirements.

The claimant, a Muslim pupil at Denbigh High School, stopped attending after the school required her to wear the approved shalwar kameeze or traditional uniform rather than a jilbab. She sought judicial review against the school and Luton Borough Council, alleging unlawful exclusion, denial of education under Article 2 of Protocol 1 to the European Convention on Human Rights, and interference with Article 9 rights.

Permission against the Council was refused. The substantive issues against the school were whether the claimant had been excluded, and, if so or otherwise, whether the school’s uniform policy infringed her Convention rights.

1. The claim was dismissed. The claimant had not been formally, informally, unofficially or constructively excluded. The school repeatedly required and invited her to return in the approved uniform. Her non-attendance resulted from her choice not to return unless allowed to wear the jilbab. The concept of constructive exclusion had no real application in the relationship between a school and its pupils.
2. The school’s uniform policy did not breach Article 9(1). The claimant’s refusal was motivated by religious belief, but the school acted to enforce its uniform policy rather than to suppress her religion. The reasoning in Stedman v United Kingdom 23 EHRR CD 168 supported that conclusion.
3. Alternatively, any limitation was justified under Article 9(2). The uniform policy was sufficiently clear and published to satisfy the requirement that the limitation be prescribed by law. The relevant legitimate aim was the proper running of a multicultural, multifaith and secular school, including protection of pupils’ rights and freedoms, social cohesion and freedom from religious or peer pressure. The policy was proportionate. The court accepted that safety concerns were not the principal justification, but found that the policy avoided divisions between pupils and accommodated Muslim dress through the shalwar kameeze.
4. Article 2 of Protocol 1 was not breached. The claimant was not denied education because she could return to the school by complying with the uniform policy, and other schools were available. The decision in A v The Headteacher and Governors of Lord Grey School [2004] EWCA Civ 382 was factually different and did not alter the result.
5. Permission to proceed against Luton Borough Council was refused. The claim against the Council could not succeed if the claim against the school failed, and no additional practical remedy would have been obtained.

First-instance judicial review decision. No earlier appellate decision is stated in the judgment.