Wattleworth v Goodwood Road Racing Company Ltd & Ors

An occupier of a motor-racing circuit must take such care as is reasonable in all the circumstances to make visitors reasonably safe. An occupier may discharge that duty by properly instructing and reasonably relying on specialist safety bodies. A body that gives safety advice may owe a duty of care where it assumes responsibility, exercises practical control and knows that its recommendations will govern foreseeable use beyond formally licensed events. The duty’s scope depends on the responsibility assumed. The MSA owed such a duty on the facts, but the FIA did not. A barrier choice addressing both low-angle and high-angle impacts was a reasonable professional judgment and did not breach the applicable standard. The claim also failed because causation was not proved.

The claimant, the widow and administratrix of Simon Wattleworth’s estate, claimed damages after his fatal accident while driving at a track day at the Goodwood circuit. Goodwood owned and operated the circuit. The MSA inspected and licensed circuits and gave safety advice. The FIA inspected the circuit for an international event.

The claim alleged negligent design and approval of a lorry-tyre-faced earth bank at the Lavant bend. The issues included whether each defendant owed a duty of care, whether the barrier was unsafe, whether the defendants breached any duty, causation, volenti and contributory negligence. The trial concerned liability and causation only.

1. Goodwood. Goodwood owed the common duty of care under section 2 of the Occupiers’ Liability Act 1957. It discharged that duty. It had properly instructed the MSA, liaised with the MSA and FIA, carefully considered the safety proposals, and followed their recommendations. The Act imposed no strict liability. The pre-Act proposition in Hall v Brooklands Auto Racing Club [1933] 1KB 205 had been overtaken by the statutory scheme.
2. MSA. The MSA owed the claimant a duty of care. Through Mr Symes it had assumed responsibility for advice on the circuit and barriers. It knew that Goodwood would apply the recommendations to foreseeable non-MSA uses, including track days, and exercised practical control because its recommendations would be followed. Specific reliance by the driver was unnecessary. The duty was confined to the responsibility assumed for the circuit and safety barriers, and did not extend to marshalling, medical services or other event controls at non-MSA events.
3. The duty analysis was supported by foreseeability, proximity and fairness, justice and reasonableness. The physical-injury context was important. The absence of a duty would have caused greater injustice on these facts. The MSA could have limited its responsibility by a clear disclaimer, but the licence wording did not displace the responsibility assumed through the parties’ course of conduct.
4. FIA. The FIA did not owe a duty of care. Its involvement was limited, focused on authorising an international event, and operated through the MSA. The FIA had less contact with Goodwood, less knowledge of other uses, issued no relevant licence, and retained primary circuit-safety responsibility with the national sporting authority.
5. Breach and causation. Applying the professional standard in Bolam v Friern Hospital Management Committee [1957] 1 WLR 582, the earth-filled lorry tyres laid in brickwork and facing the bank were a reasonable compromise. They provided a smooth, continuous and vertical face for the probable low-angle impact while retaining energy-absorbing properties for the less probable high-angle impact. The alleged sliding benefits of conveyor belting were unsupported by experiments or established practice. The MSA therefore exercised reasonable skill and care, and Goodwood also discharged its duty. In any event, the claimant failed to prove that conveyor belting would have prevented the pocketing or that the fatal injury occurred at the third impact.
6. The defence of volenti would have failed. The claimant accepted the inherent risks of motor racing, not the risk of negligent circuit safety. Had liability been established, contributory negligence would have been assessed at 20 per cent for failing to brake after leaving the track. The claim was dismissed against all three defendants.