Qaadria Jilaani Trust, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State

On a claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, the court may intervene where an inspector’s reasoning is unintelligible or fails to support the conclusion reached. A planning policy directed to noise pollution must be applied according to its terms and context. Policy EH4 covered noise from premises and from vehicular or pedestrian movements, but did not itself provide a general ground of objection based on traffic or amenity. A decision may be quashed where one material ground is unsustainable and the remaining grounds cannot safely be separated. A personal planning permission is directed to exceptional personal or compassionate circumstances, not merely to a use beneficial to the community.

The claimant charitable trust sought permission to convert residential premises in Telford into a community training centre. The local planning authority refused permission on grounds relating to noise, disturbance, traffic and the effect of access and parking works on protected trees. An inspector dismissed the appeal, relying on Policy EH4 of the adopted local plan for the noise and disturbance ground and Policy OL11 for the trees ground. The trust challenged the inspector’s decision under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, alleging errors of law, inadequate reasoning and failures concerning planning conditions, a personal permission and a temporary permission.

1. The claim was allowed. The inspector’s reasoning on the protected trees issue was unintelligible and could not justify the conclusion that the proposed access and parking arrangements would compromise the trees’ health and longevity. The only technical evidence supported a no-dig construction method, while the inspector relied on experience concerning digging without explaining its relevance to that method.
2. Policy EH4 was concerned with noise, including noise generated by the premises and by vehicular or pedestrian movements to, from or within the development. Traffic generation might constitute a separate planning objection, but it was not within EH4 merely because it affected local amenities.
3. The inspector was entitled to conclude that increased vehicular and pedestrian movements in a quiet residential area would cause significant noise disturbance. That conclusion, viewed alone, disclosed no error of law. The court could not substitute its own planning judgment for that of the inspector.
4. The inspector was entitled to distinguish the comparable Regent Street development because the locations and parking arrangements differed. A personal permission under paragraph 93 of Circular 11/95 was inappropriate: personal or compassionate grounds concern a development required for the benefit of an individual, not a community facility supported because it benefits the neighbourhood.
5. A temporary permission could be appropriate where the decision-maker was uncertain whether unacceptable effects would occur. It was not appropriate where the inspector was satisfied that the use would cause unacceptable harm. The inspector was not required to devise alternative conditions himself.
6. The tree and noise grounds could not safely be treated as independent. The loss of parking capacity resulting from the trees issue could strengthen the noise objection, and it was impossible to know whether the inspector had taken that relationship into account. The decision was therefore quashed. Costs were subject to detailed assessment if not agreed, and permission to appeal was refused.

The judgment describes an appeal to a planning inspector following refusal of planning permission by the local planning authority. The High Court allowed the statutory challenge under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 and quashed the inspector’s decision. Permission to appeal was refused.