Chiltern District Council, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State & Anor

Under section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, a development plan remains the starting point, but permission may be granted where material considerations justify departing from its policies. National planning guidance must be read as a whole. A reference to a particular paragraph does not establish legal error if the decision-maker’s reasoning shows a correct understanding of the policy’s general thrust. An inspector’s planning judgment will not be disturbed where the decision letter identifies evidence supporting the relevant conclusions and the conclusion is not irrational. Employment land may properly be characterised as poorly sited where its isolated industrial use lies within a mainly residential area and its future employment potential is limited.

The claimant local planning authority challenged, under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990, an inspector’s decision allowing Try Homes Limited’s appeal against refusal of planning permission. The proposed development combined offices, flats and houses on a site identified for business, industrial, storage or distribution use.

The inspector accepted that the proposal breached local employment-land policies but considered that material considerations, including housing need, the site’s poor location for employment use and the likely closure of the existing business, justified permission. The central issues were whether the inspector had misunderstood PPG3, failed to give adequate reasons for describing the site as poorly sited employment land, or reached a perverse conclusion about the effect on the supply of business land.

1. The claim was dismissed. The inspector was entitled to conclude that material considerations outweighed the conflict with local plan policies under section 54A of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990.

2. The court accepted that paragraph 42 of PPG3, and the draft paragraph 42A, had no direct application to a site currently in employment use. However, the inspector’s reference to more recent guidance did not show that she had misunderstood national policy. PPG3 had to be read as a whole, including its policies favouring the re-use of previously developed land, regeneration, housing and mixed-use development.

3. Applying the approach in South Somerset District Council v Secretary of State for the Environment [1995] PLR 83, the decision letter had to be read fairly and in context. The inspector’s planning judgment, rather than a technical examination of each policy reference, was the relevant focus. The court also had regard to Seddon Properties v Secretary of State for the Environment (1981) 42 P&CR 26.

4. The reasons adequately supported the conclusion that the site was poorly sited employment land. The evidence showed an isolated industrial use in a mainly residential area, limited facilities for business use, and a substantial likelihood that the existing business would close. That evidence was uncontradicted.

5. The finding that the proposal would not harm the supply of business land was not perverse. The evidence supported the view that disposing of much of this particular site would not significantly reduce the authority’s available employment-land stock. The need for small housing units was a further material consideration capable of outweighing the policy conflict.

6. Permission to appeal was refused. The Secretary of State’s costs were summarily assessed at £6,906.88; no order for the second defendant’s costs was pursued.

First-instance judicial review under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990. Permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was refused.