O, R (on the application of) v Stratford Youth Court

[2004] EWHC 1553 (Admin)

Case details

Case citations
[2004] EWHC 1553 (Admin)
Court
High Court (Administrative Court)
Judgment date
23 June 2004
Judgment text

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Subjects
Criminal procedure Administrative law Autrefois acquit
Keywords
youth court dismissal after no evidence reopening criminal proceedings functus officio autrefois acquit judicial review section 142 Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980
Outcome
claim succeeded
Judicial consideration

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Summary

Once a criminal charge has been dismissed after the prosecution offers no evidence, the magistrates’ court is functus officio. It has no inherent power to reopen the proceedings because the prosecution has subsequently obtained evidence or considers a further hearing to be in the interests of justice. Any attempted rehearing would expose the defendant to an autrefois acquit plea. The dismissal must therefore stand, subject to any distinct statutory power that properly applies.

Factual background

The claimant, aged 17, faced trial in the youth court on a charge of indecent assault. On the adjourned trial date, the complainant and other civilian witnesses were absent. The prosecution’s application for a further adjournment was refused, following which it offered no evidence and the justices dismissed the charge.

The complainant was later found, and the prosecution applied to reconvene the court. Its initial reliance on section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 was abandoned. The justices instead relied on an asserted inherent power to reopen the case, rescinded the dismissal and adjourned the proceedings. The claimant sought judicial review of that decision.

Held

  1. The application was granted. The youth court’s decision to reopen the proceedings after dismissing the charge was quashed.
  2. Where the prosecution has offered no evidence and the court has dismissed the charge, the court is functus officio. It cannot revive the proceedings by invoking an inherent power to reopen the case in the interests of justice.
  3. The subsequent discovery that the complainant was available did not alter the legal effect of the dismissal. Any further hearing concerning the same charge would inevitably give rise to a plea of autrefois acquit.
  4. The prosecution initially relied on section 142 of the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, described as effectively a slip-rule provision, but abandoned that submission. The court therefore did not decide that statutory issue.
  5. The fact that the complainant later left the jurisdiction and that a retrial could not in any event proceed did not affect the legal question, which was whether the youth court had jurisdiction to reopen the dismissed proceedings. It did not.

The court’s approach to earlier authorities

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Appellate history

The application for judicial review was brought with permission granted by Leveson J. The Divisional Court granted the application and quashed the youth court’s decision to reopen the dismissed proceedings.

Key cases cited

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Cases citing this case

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