Castillo v Spain & Anor

In extradition proceedings, the requesting state must provide a fair and accurate description of the conduct alleged to constitute the offence. This requirement is distinct from evidential sufficiency. The court may scrutinise the description where materials call its accuracy or fairness into question, without conducting a trial of the evidence.

Under section 11(3) of the Extradition Act 1989, discharge is available only if the relevant ground is established in relation to every offence for which return is sought. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State should not return a person on a charge where the court has found that return on that charge would be unjust or oppressive. A materially inaccurate description may invalidate committal for particular charges even where the accusation was not made in bad faith.

The applicant, a Spanish citizen detained in the United Kingdom, made a second application for habeas corpus during extradition proceedings brought at Spain’s request. The requests concerned alleged terrorist offences arising from three incidents. The first request had been withdrawn. The present challenge principally concerned charges relating to an alleged attempt to place an explosive device under a police officer’s car and charges arising from an attack on Banco Santander.

The applicant argued that the description of the conduct in the extradition request was materially inaccurate and misleading, that the accusations were not made in good faith, and that the conduct did not constitute the equivalent United Kingdom offences. The central issues were the court’s power to scrutinise the description of conduct, the meaning of good faith under section 11(3) of the Extradition Act 1989, and the consequences for the individual charges.

1. The application succeeded in part. The applicant was discharged on charges 6 and 7, namely attempted murder and attempting to cause really serious bodily injury to the police officer. The application failed in relation to charges 1 to 3 and charge 5.
2. Article 12 of the European Convention on Extradition Order 2001, together with the United Kingdom’s reservation in Schedule 2, required the request to contain an accurate description of the conduct alleged to constitute the offences. The requirement did not impose a requirement of evidential sufficiency. However, the accuracy and fairness of the description were central to the Secretary of State’s and the court’s decisions.
3. The description in the request was materially defective. It failed to explain that the police officer was inside his house rather than near the vehicle, that the device required a fuse to be lit, and that the explosive remnants had been found approximately 150 metres away. On a proper description, there was no basis for charges 6 and 7. The conduct could nevertheless constitute an attempt to cause an explosion likely to endanger life, because a device capable of causing fire and explosion under a car in a city street could endanger persons in the vicinity.
4. Following Re Debs, the wording of section 11(3) required the court’s finding to relate to every offence for which return was sought before it could order discharge under that subsection. Since the Banco Santander accusations were not shown to lack good faith, section 11(3) was not satisfied.
5. The term “accusation” in section 11(3) had a broad meaning. It included the evidence of witnesses, the process in the requesting state before the request, and the description of conduct in the request. A deliberately exaggerated description could therefore form part of an accusation made otherwise than in good faith. Mere lack of care did not establish bad faith. The court found no deliberate exaggeration or improper motive by the Spanish authorities.
6. Because the District Judge had committed the applicant on charges 6 and 7 on the basis of the defective description, the court exercised its discretion to discharge him on those charges immediately. Remittal was unnecessary.

This was a second habeas corpus application in extradition proceedings. The judgment records that the applicant had previously been committed by the District Judge and that his first habeas corpus application was dismissed: [2002] EWCH 1302 (Admin). The present court thereafter considered the second application and granted only partial relief.