PS & Ors v Law Society

An intervention challenge under the Solicitors Act 1974 may be summarily dismissed where the evidence gives the Law Society reason to suspect dishonesty and the claimant has no real prospect of establishing otherwise. The court must assess the evidence available when the application is decided, rather than confining itself to the evidence available when the intervention was imposed. The pending appeal from disciplinary findings does not necessarily prevent summary dismissal. Proceedings may also be dismissed where the court could provide no worthwhile practical relief after the intervention and related disciplinary process. Costs ordinarily follow the event, and indemnity costs may be justified where the claimant knew that the challenge was likely to fail.

Six claimants challenged the Law Society’s intervention in the practice of the first claimant under Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974. The intervention had followed inspections of the practice and disciplinary proceedings concerning alleged dishonest conduct by the first claimant.

The Law Society applied under CPR 24.2(a)(i) for summary dismissal. By the hearing, the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal had found dishonesty proved, although the first claimant had appealed those findings to the Administrative Court. The issues were whether the claim had a real prospect of success and whether any worthwhile relief remained available.

1. The claim was dismissed summarily. Under CPR 24.2(a)(i), the court considered whether the claim had a real prospect of success on the evidence available at the time of the application.

2. Paragraph 6(5) of Part 2 of Schedule 1 to the Solicitors Act 1974 required the court to determine the issue in the light of all evidence existing when the matter came to be decided. The principle stated in Buckley v The Law Society (No 2) 1984 1 WLR 1101 was applied. The later disciplinary findings could therefore be considered, even though an appeal remained pending.

3. The court held that, whatever the outcome of the appeal, there was no real prospect of establishing that the Law Society lacked reason to suspect dishonesty in February 2002. The statutory threshold concerned the Society’s reason to suspect dishonesty at that time, and the evidence made a successful challenge impossible in practical terms.

4. There was a further basis for dismissal. The only relief identified was a declaration that the original intervention had been unjustified. A trial would not provide worthwhile relief in circumstances where the first claimant could obtain that declaration only by succeeding on all his appeals against the disciplinary findings. The approach discussed in Virdi v The Law Society unreported 30th March 2000, relying on the Court of Appeal’s unreported decision in the Buckley case, supported that conclusion.

5. The first claimant was ordered to pay the Law Society’s costs of the intervention proceedings on the indemnity basis. The second and third claimants were ordered to pay those costs up to 7 June 2002 on the standard basis, because they had participated as parties until then but had subsequently indicated that they sought no further relief.