Irwin, R (on the application of) v Sutton Magistrates' Court

A magistrates’ court may adjourn a trial only by exercising its discretion on proper judicial principles. The application must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny, and the court must identify a reason for the adjournment and explain why it is necessary. The interests of both the defendant and the prosecution, including the public interest in a proper adjudication, must be considered. Where the justices grant a further adjournment without knowing why it is required, they have failed to exercise their discretion. In a sufficiently prolonged process, the resulting unfairness may justify judicial review intervention and dismissal of the outstanding information.

The claimant faced one remaining information alleging a hoax fire-brigade call after 11 of 12 charges were accepted to have been laid out of time. The prosecution repeatedly sought or caused adjournments, including because its witnesses had not been warned for the trial listed on 13 February 2004. The claimant opposed a further adjournment, relying on the extended chronology and his poor health.

The Sutton Magistrates’ Court nevertheless adjourned the trial, although it could provide no explanation for the request and asked for an explanation at the next hearing. The claimant sought judicial review of that decision. The central issue was whether the justices had lawfully exercised their discretion to adjourn.

1. Application allowed. The decision to adjourn was quashed, and the remaining information against the claimant was dismissed.
2. Section 10 of the Magistrates' Court Act gives the justices power to adjourn a trial at any time. That power is discretionary, and an appellate or supervisory court must exercise caution before interfering with it.
3. Nonetheless, the discretion must be exercised on proper judicial principles. An adjournment requires a reason and an explanation of why it is necessary. The court must scrutinise the application rigorously and consider the interests of both sides, including the public interest in the proper adjudication of a properly preferred charge and the defendant’s interest in a prompt resolution.
4. The justices were unaware why a further adjournment was required. Their direction that an explanation should be provided at the next hearing demonstrated that they had granted the adjournment without knowing its basis. That amounted to a non-exercise of discretion.
5. The prolonged history, repeated delay and absence of any satisfactory explanation meant that fairness was no longer possible. The adjournment was therefore unlawfully granted and the remaining information was dismissed. The court directed the usual form of public funding assessment and made no order for costs out of central funds.

not stated in the judgment.