Corporation of London v Eurostar (UK) Ltd

For criminal regulatory offences, mens rea is not invariably required. The court must consider the statutory language, purpose, the danger addressed, the likely efficacy of strict liability, the penalty and any statutory defence. An offence prohibiting the landing of animals may therefore be one of strict liability where those considerations show that Parliament intended an absolute prohibition, subject to an available statutory defence.

Deeming an animal to have been landed in a foreign control zone does not exclude a later actual landing in Great Britain. Where legislation extends the meaning of landing to transport through the Channel Tunnel and control zones, liability is not confined to the person who physically unloads the animal. A carrier responsible for operating the relevant service may be liable as principal.

The Corporation of London appealed by way of case stated from the dismissal of an information by District Judge Gillibrand at Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court on 12 February 2003. The respondent had been charged with landing a prohibited German shepherd dog at Waterloo International Rail Terminal, contrary to article 16(1) of the Rabies (Importation of Dogs, Cats and other Mammals) Order 1974 and section 73 of the Animal Health Act 1981.

The stated questions concerned the effect of a deemed landing in a Paris control zone, whether the carrier could be liable as principal or secondary party, whether it had caused or permitted the landing, and whether it had a statutory defence.

1. Appeal allowed and case remitted. The District Judge’s dismissal was wrong in law. The respondent was to be convicted, and the case was remitted to the Magistrates’ Court with that direction.
2. The statutory scheme attributed the acts of agents operating Eurostar services in the United Kingdom to the respondent, subject to the statutory language, content and policy. The agreed evidence showed that the respondent had assumed responsibility for running the relevant service in the United Kingdom.
3. Article 16(1), read with article 4(1), created an offence of strict liability. The court considered the statutory purpose, the grave danger of rabies, the need for effective compliance, the penalty and the statutory defence in section 73(1) of the Animal Health Act 1981. The offence was absolute, subject to that defence.
4. The amended definition of landing extended liability beyond the person physically unloading the animal. The 1990 amendment addressed animals transported through the Channel Tunnel, and the 1993 amendment extended the provision to control zones in France or Belgium. The respondent could accordingly be convicted as principal.
5. A deemed landing in a Paris control zone did not preclude a subsequent actual landing at Waterloo. Article 2(2) supplied an additional location for enforcing United Kingdom controls and did not exclude the ordinary operation of the legislation on the mainland.
6. The respondent could establish neither lawful authority nor lawful excuse. A belief that SNCF would enforce British law could have prevented the landing but could not make an unauthorised landing lawful. The four questions were answered: yes, no, yes, and no. The respondent was ordered to pay the appellant’s certified costs of £11,074.50.

• Horseferry Road Magistrates’ Court: District Judge Gillibrand dismissed the summons on 12 February 2003 and stated four questions for the High Court.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was allowed. The dismissal was set aside in substance, the questions were answered, and the case was remitted with a direction to convict.