Firstdale Ltd. v Quinton

Authority to accept service is defined by the document, claim and claimant identified when the authority is given. A solicitor authorised to accept service for an original claimant is not ordinarily authorised to accept service of proceedings brought by an assignee of that claim.

A defective claim form is not necessarily a nullity. Where the defendant understood the nature of the claim and suffered no prejudice, striking out for omitted descriptive detail or an imperfect signature is disproportionate. A statutory assignment may be effective under Law of Property Act 1925, section 136(1), even though the assignee’s execution of the intended deed is defective, provided the assignor’s signed writing effects an absolute assignment.

The claimant, the parent company of Branston & Gothard Ltd, sought to recover from the defendant a sum arising from his contractual liability for client defaults. The original claim had been pursued by Branston & Gothard’s liquidators, whose solicitors had been told that they were authorised to accept service.

After an assignment to the claimant, proceedings were issued and the claim form was served personally on the defendant after the solicitors’ earlier authority had been given. The defendant applied for orders that service was invalid and that the claim be struck out, relying also on defects in the claim form, the notice of assignment and the execution of the assignment. The claimant applied retrospectively to dispense with service under CPR 6.9.

1. Service. The defendant’s solicitors’ notification that they were authorised to accept service related to the claim form and claim previously advanced by Branston & Gothard through its liquidators. CPR 6.4 and 6.5 require the document and the party serving it to be identified by reference to essential characteristics. The claimant’s later proceedings were brought by a different claimant, in a different capacity, as statutory assignee. The earlier notification therefore did not engage the mandatory service provisions for these proceedings. Service at the defendant’s residential address was valid.
2. Dispensation. The claimant’s application under CPR 6.9 did not arise. Had it been necessary to decide it, the application would have been refused. Although the defendant had received the claim form personally within the period of validity, the required method involved prior receipt by the solicitor authorised to accept service. The strict approach to retrospective dispensation indicated in Anderton v Clwyd County Council [2002] 1 WLR 3174, Cranfield v Bridgegrove Ltd [2003] EWCA Civ 656 and Wilkey and Dass Systems Ltd v BBC and Moyles [2002] EWCA Civ 1561 would have prevented the order.
3. Claim form. The omissions concerning the contract, assignment and claimant’s capacity were procedural defects, not a nullity. The defendant understood the substance of the claim and suffered no prejudice. Striking out would therefore have been disproportionate under CPR 3.10 and the overriding objective. The solicitor’s printed name beneath the firm’s name effectively identified the solicitor responsible, and the signature defect did not justify strike-out.
4. Assignment. Sending the executed assignment to the defendant constituted valid, or at least strongly arguable, notice under section 136(1) of the Law of Property Act 1925; the presence of more than one date did not misdescribe the assignment. Even if the claimant had failed to execute the document as a deed under section 36A of the Companies Act 1985, the liquidator’s signature could operate as an absolute assignment by writing. A deed was unnecessary, consideration was not required, and the claimant probably had title to sue.
5. The defendant’s applications were refused. The claimant’s application did not arise.