Bristol City Council, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State & Ors

Planning policy guidance must be applied through planning judgment, having regard to the particular circumstances of the site. Guidance in paragraph 10 of PPG17 did not make a surplus assessment an automatic precondition to residential development. The absence of such an assessment was one part of the overall planning judgment under the statutory development plan.

An inspector may conclude that previously-developed urban land has not blended into its surroundings and remains suitable for redevelopment. Whether land previously used informally by the public is required for amenity purposes depends on the evidence, including the prospect of renewed use and the local context. A site-specific and intelligible assessment will not be irrational merely because another planning judgment was possible.

The claimant applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash an inspector’s decision granting planning permission for residential development in Bristol. The inspector had allowed two appeals arising from the local planning authority’s failure to determine applications within the prescribed time and had allowed a third appeal for public open space, which was not challenged.

The challenge concerned the inspector’s treatment of open-space policy, particularly paragraph 10 of PPG17, and the definition of previously-developed land in Annex C to PPG3. The central issues were whether the inspector had misapplied the guidance, failed to require an assessment of surplus open space, or reached an irrational or inadequately reasoned conclusion.

1. The application was refused. The inspector’s decision was not unlawful and the claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 failed.
2. Annex C to PPG3 was not to be applied mechanically. Whether land previously occupied by permanent structures had blended into the landscape so that it could reasonably be regarded as part of the natural surroundings involved planning judgment. The inspector was entitled, following his site inspection, to conclude that the former buildings remained unmistakable from the landform and the gap in the street block. His observation that there were no natural surroundings was directed to this intensely urban site and did not establish a general rule for all urban land.
3. Paragraph 10 of PPG17 had been taken into account. The absence of an assessment showing that the land was surplus to requirements was not automatically fatal. The inspector had to apply the general policy guidance to the particular circumstances and consider it as part of the overall issue under policy NE1(iv) of the local plan.
4. The inspector was entitled to consider that the local authority had not itself carried out an assessment, that the applicant had supplied some information about nearby green spaces, that public use of the site did not necessarily establish a requirement for its retention, and that the prospect of renewed amenity use was doubtful. The disputed public right of access and the site’s particular urban setting were material considerations.
5. The proposed public open space was also relevant. The inspector was entitled to conclude that, viewed with the land in appeal C, it would provide a well-sited and substantial asset. His pragmatic, site-specific approach was intelligible and could not be characterised as unreasonable.