Attorney General v Benton

A civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 should be made where the statutory conditions are satisfied and the litigant’s persistent proceedings are abusive, vexatious and without reasonable grounds. The court must exercise its discretion by balancing protection of the public and court resources against the litigant’s prima facie right of access to the courts. An order should be limited only where there is a rational and predictable basis for concluding that the restriction will cease to be necessary at a specified time. Where the litigant’s activities are wide-ranging and the medical evidence gives no basis for predicting abatement, an unlimited order is appropriate. Proceedings materially different from the abusive litigation may be excluded from the order, with permission given to apply to join existing group litigation.

The Attorney General applied for a civil proceedings order against Paul Benton under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The defendant consented to the making of an order, accepting that he had issued proceedings habitually and persistently, without reasonable grounds and vexatiously.

The issues were whether the order should be limited to a specified period and how the defendant’s proposed involvement in the Tennal Group Litigation and two other claims should be treated. The court considered the defendant’s extensive litigation history, his psychiatric evidence, and the previous limited orders made in Attorney General v Price and Attorney General v Yeo.

1. The statutory preconditions for a civil proceedings order were satisfied. The defendant had commenced 32 sets of proceedings in 26 months, at least 25 of which had been struck out at an early stage as abusive, vexatious or disclosing no reasonable grounds. The defendant accepted the relevant characterisation of his conduct.
2. The court’s discretion had to be exercised by giving substantial weight to protecting members of the public and preserving court resources, while recognising the defendant’s prima facie right to invoke the civil courts. In the circumstances, that balance required an order.
3. Section 42(2) of the Supreme Court Act 1981 permits a civil proceedings order to cease after a specified period but otherwise provides for an indefinite order. A limited order is appropriate only where there is a rational basis for predicting that the restriction will cease to serve a useful purpose at a defined date. The earlier orders in Attorney General v Price and Attorney General v Yeo did not establish that a time limit was appropriate here.
4. The defendant’s litigation had covered varied defendants and subject matters. The psychiatric report gave no basis for estimating that his activities or ambitions would abate at a particular future date. The civil proceedings order was therefore unlimited.
5. The Tennal Group Litigation, BM 303969 and BM 117029 were excluded from the order because they were materially different in character from the abusive proceedings. The court gave permission, pursuant to the order, for the defendant to apply to join the group litigation; the decision on eligibility and joinder remained for the judge conducting that litigation.