Brighton and Hove City Council, R (on the application of) v Brighton and Hove Justices

Costs in judicial review proceedings remain subject to the court’s overall assessment of justice. The court may reduce costs where a party has incurred excessive costs or introduced irrelevant evidence. A party who was not properly notified of a hearing may recover the costs of attendance made necessary by that failure. Costs caused by an unnecessary adjournment may likewise be awarded against the party responsible. Where an offer to avoid further proceedings was sensible and was not properly answered, the court may take that conduct into account and make no order for costs.

The Council brought proceedings concerning an order made by Brighton and Hove Justices and sought an order requiring the Justices to reconsider the matter. The proceedings involved hearings before Henriques J, Lindsay J and Stanley Burnton J. Michael Hamdan, the interested party, contended that he had not been properly served with notice of the first hearing. The second hearing was adjourned at the Council’s request. Before the final hearing, Mr Hamdan’s solicitors proposed that the Justices’ order be set aside so that the matter could be reconsidered, but the proposal was not answered. The court therefore addressed the allocation and reduction of costs and the appropriate order concerning the Magistrates’ decision.

1. The court made an order quashing the order of the Magistrates and required them to reconsider the matter in the light of the judgment.
2. Mr Hamdan was entitled in principle to the costs of the hearing before Henriques J because the evidence indicated that he had not been sufficiently notified. His attendance would have been unnecessary had proper notice been given.
3. Mr Hamdan was also entitled to the costs of and occasioned by the adjournment before Lindsay J, which had been sought by the Council to enable it to file a skeleton argument.
4. Although the Council would ordinarily have been entitled to the costs of the final hearing, the court reduced the costs that would otherwise have been awarded. The Council’s costs were excessive, much of its evidence was irrelevant, and the issues had not been properly analysed.
5. The proposal to set aside the Magistrates’ order and permit reconsideration was sensible and, if accepted, would have avoided the final hearing. The Council should have responded appropriately to the proposal. Taking that circumstance together with the costs otherwise payable to Mr Hamdan and the reduction required for excessive costs, the just order was no order for costs.

The judgment records earlier hearings before Henriques J and Lindsay J, but does not state an appellate history.