Bleta, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for the Home Department

Under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003, a request based on a conviction must state, expressly or equivalently, that the person is unlawfully at large. The request need not use the statutory words. In a clear case, the Secretary of State may examine the request and its supporting documents to determine whether the necessary statement is present in substance. However, where the request contains no such statement or equivalent, the Secretary of State should not infer unlawfully-at-large status merely from a conviction, an arrest warrant, finality of the conviction, or a reference to Article 12 of the European Convention on Extradition. A purposive construction does not permit the court to fill an evidential gap which the requesting state could readily have avoided.

The claimant sought judicial review of a certificate issued by the Secretary of State under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003, concerning an extradition request from Albania based on a conviction in the claimant’s absence. The request described the conviction and sentence, referred to Article 12 of the European Convention on Extradition, and included supporting documents. It did not state that the claimant was unlawfully at large.

Permission was initially directed by Harrison J and was granted by a Divisional Court after amendment of the claim form. The remaining issue was whether the Secretary of State could treat the request and its documents as containing the statement required by section 70(4)(b), despite the absence of express or equivalent wording.

1. The claim succeeded. The certificate issued under section 70 of the Extradition Act 2003 was quashed. The claimant was remanded in custody pending any application for permission to appeal, and bail was refused.
2. The Act was to be construed purposively. The court accepted the principles in R v Governor of Ashford Remand Centre, ex parte Postlethwaite [1988] AC 924 and In re Ismail [1999] AC 320, namely that extradition treaties and legislation giving effect to them should receive a broad construction consistent with their language, object and purpose.
3. The statement required by section 70(4) need not reproduce the statutory words. An equivalent expression indicating liability to immediate arrest following conviction would suffice. In a clear case, the Secretary of State may examine the request together with documents incorporated into it to determine whether the necessary statement is present in substance.
4. The Albanian request was not a clear case. The conviction, the earlier arrest warrant, the statement that the conviction had become final, and the reference to Article 12 did not establish that the claimant was unlawfully at large after conviction. The court was not entitled to assume that Albanian law operated in the same way as English law, or to speculate that immediate liability to arrest followed automatically from conviction.
5. The absence of the required statement was material because its inclusion would remove the need for the Secretary of State to investigate the law of the requesting state. It was unsafe to fill the gap when it could readily have been avoided by the requesting state.
6. The court exercised its power under section 5 of the Administration of Justice Act 1960 to remand the claimant in custody. The seriousness of the conviction and sentence, together with the risk of absconding, justified refusing bail. Any prolonged appeal might justify reconsideration of bail in light of the claimant’s family circumstances.

The judgment was a first-instance judicial review decision. The judgment records that permission was initially directed by Harrison J and subsequently granted by a Divisional Court after amendment of the claim form.