National Anti-Vivisection Society v First Secretary of State

At a local planning inquiry, the merits of established Government policy are generally not open for reconsideration. The inquiry should focus on the proposal and its planning consequences, while the decision-maker must apply relevant policy and weigh competing planning considerations. Government policy may include a policy to promote centres of scientific excellence and to locate them near established university expertise. A condition need not ordinarily be imposed where it was neither requested nor canvassed at the inquiry. Procedural errors justify relief only where they could have caused material prejudice.

The claimant challenged the First Secretary of State’s decision to grant the University of Cambridge planning permission for a research centre in the Green Belt. The claimant argued that the Secretary of State had relied on Government policy which was not genuinely policy, had predetermined the outcome, had acted unfairly because two witness statements were not supplied, and should have imposed a condition restricting the permitted use.

The Inspector had recommended refusal, principally because the need and national importance of the proposal had not been demonstrated by objective scientific evidence. The Secretary of State disagreed and treated ministerial statements supporting the centre as Government policy and as establishing need. The issues were whether that approach involved an error of law, whether the procedural omission caused unfairness, and whether a restrictive condition was required.

1. Claim dismissed. The Secretary of State had made no error of law in treating the promotion of centres of scientific excellence as Government policy and in attaching substantial weight to the policy benefits of the proposed centre.
2. Following Bushell v Secretary of State for the Environment [1981] AC 75, a local planning inquiry is not the appropriate forum for reconsidering the merits of Government policy. The distinction between policy and its application is not always exact. A general policy may properly include the means by which it is to be implemented.
3. The policy that centres of scientific excellence should be established, and that such a centre should be located at or near a university able to provide relevant scientific expertise, was properly treated as Government policy. The evidence and policy considerations pointed sufficiently to Cambridge. The Secretary of State was entitled to conclude that the proposal met an identified need and that the policy benefits were substantial.
4. The decision was not shown to have been predetermined. Applying Government policy did not prevent the Secretary of State from considering the planning objections, and the claimant had not established that the ministerial letters closed his mind.
5. As to conditions, the general principle in Top Deck Holdings Ltd v Secretary of State for the Environment [1991] JPL 961, supported by Marie Finlay v Secretary of State for the Environment and London Borough of Islington [1983] JPL 802, was that an inspector or Secretary of State is not required to devise a condition which neither party requested or canvassed. The proposed restriction was not obviously required and would have presented drafting difficulties.
6. The omission of two witness statements was an error, but caused no conceivable prejudice. The substance of the evidence was summarised in the Inspector’s report, and the Secretary of State was entitled to rely on that report. The procedural ground therefore failed.
7. The defendant was awarded the costs of the claim, subject to setting off the claimant’s reasonable costs of an amendment application which had become unnecessary after the defendant withdrew its objection.

First-instance judicial review claim. The judgment records no earlier court decision in the same proceedings.