Snelgrove, R (on the application of) v Crown Court At Woolwich & Anor

Applications to dismiss charges sent to the Crown Court under section 51 and Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 concern trial on indictment. They therefore fall within the exclusion of judicial review in section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The exclusion reflects Parliament’s policy of avoiding delay in criminal proceedings. The Crown Court’s assessment of whether evidence would be sufficient for a jury properly to convict is part of the trial process, even though it occurs before arraignment. The ordinary trial process, and an appeal after conviction, provide the relevant remedies. The judge hearing a dismissal application has discretion over the use of disclosed material, adjournments and oral evidence, subject to the statutory test and the interests of justice.

The claimant faced trial in the Crown Court at Woolwich on an indictment alleging wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm, contrary to section 18 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861. The prosecution case depended principally on identification evidence from one witness. The claimant relied on inconsistencies, crime reports and material concerning the witness’s mental health.

The Crown Court refused disclosure of psychiatric records, an adjournment, permission to call psychiatric evidence and an application to dismiss the charge under paragraph 2 of Schedule 3 to the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The central issue was whether those decisions were matters relating to trial on indictment and therefore outside the High Court’s judicial review jurisdiction under section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The merits of the challenged decisions arose only in the alternative.

1. Claim dismissed for want of jurisdiction. The decisions concerning dismissal of the charge were orders in matters relating to trial on indictment within section 29(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
2. The statutory language is broad. Following Smalley [1985] A.C. 622, Sampson [1987] 1 WLR 194, Ashton [1994] 1 A.C. 9 and Manchester Crown Court [1993] 1 WLR 1524, the relevant pointers were whether the decision affected the conduct of the trial, was integral to the trial process, and arose from the issue between the Crown and the accused formulated by the indictment.
3. The dismissal procedure satisfies each pointer. The Crown Court is seized of the case after sending under section 51 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. The decision whether the evidence would suffice for a jury properly to convict determines whether the trial proceeds, forms part of the trial process, and concerns the issue between prosecution and accused.
4. The availability of judicial review would introduce delay, uncertainty and anomalous distinctions between dismissal applications, abuse-of-process applications and applications to quash an indictment. The reasoning in Asil Nadir [1993] 1 WLR 949 had been overtaken and could not stand with the later House of Lords authorities. The claimant’s remedies lay in the trial process and, if convicted, an appeal.
5. Alternatively, the merits did not justify relief. The judge had discretion to determine what use to make of the crime reports, whether to adjourn, and whether to receive oral or psychiatric evidence. He had considered the disclosed material and was entitled to leave questions concerning reliability, admissibility and cross-examination to the trial. There was no procedural irregularity, illegality, irrationality or breach of Article 6. Mr Justice Richards agreed.

The claim was brought for judicial review of decisions made by the Crown Court at Woolwich. The High Court dismissed the claim for want of jurisdiction and stated that, alternatively, it would have dismissed the claim on the merits.