Chief Constable of Avon & Somerset, R (on the application of) v Police Appeals Tribunal

A police appeals tribunal hearing an appeal under the Police Act 1996 has power to reconsider the matter and reach its own conclusion on the appropriate outcome. It must have regard to the decision below, but may depart from it if persuaded that it was wrong. The Secretary of State’s guidance cannot lawfully restrict that statutory jurisdiction or require the tribunal to apply a limited reasonableness review. In disciplinary proceedings, the authority bears the burden of establishing the misconduct and any facts relied upon for penalty. Material factors affecting sentence should be disclosed to the officer in sufficient time to permit a fair response.

The Chief Constable sought judicial review of a Police Appeals Tribunal decision allowing PC Hopes’s appeal against a requirement to resign. The tribunal substituted a financial penalty. The challenge alleged that the tribunal had applied the wrong test by treating its task as determining whether resignation was a reasonably appropriate response, rather than reviewing whether the original decision was unreasonable. It was also argued that no reasonable tribunal could have imposed a lesser sanction. The central issues were the statutory nature of the tribunal’s appellate jurisdiction, the effect of Secretary of State guidance, and whether the tribunal’s decision was legally and evidentially permissible.

1. The claim was dismissed with costs. The Police Appeals Tribunal is an expert appellate body. The statutory framework permits it to hear evidence, consider fresh material and substitute a lesser sanction available to the original decision-maker. An appeal therefore gives it power to reconsider the matter and exercise its own judgment. It must take account of the decision below and may be slow to differ from it, but it must apply the result it considers correct when persuaded that the earlier decision was wrong (paras 25–29).
2. The approach in Lothbury Investment Corporation Ltd v Inland Revenue Commissioners [1981] 1 Ch 47 supported that construction. The tribunal’s jurisdiction was not confined to a Associated Provincial Picture Houses v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223 review. The guidance issued under section 87 did not apply to the tribunal and was legally wrong insofar as it purported to limit its powers to review. The proper construction of the legislation was a question of law and could not be altered by guidance (paras 21–29).
3. The Chief Constable’s statement that the innocent explanations had not been shown to be true risked reversing the burden of proof. The authority had to establish the offence and, where relevant, the facts relied upon for sentence. The required standard depended on the gravity of the allegation and was not necessarily proof beyond being sure (paras 17–18).
4. The tribunal’s reasons could have been fuller, but its decision showed that it had considered the explanation, service record, personal circumstances and character evidence. The evidence could support treating the second charge as less culpable than it otherwise appeared. The tribunal was entitled to conclude that requiring resignation was not an appropriate response and to substitute a financial penalty (paras 30–35).
5. Potential employment consequences, including difficulty assigning operational duties because of concerns about notebook accuracy, could be relevant to sentence. Such matters should be raised openly and in advance, with a proper opportunity for the officer to respond. They did not automatically justify the most severe penalty (paras 32–34).

First-instance judicial review. The claim challenging the Police Appeals Tribunal’s decision was dismissed with costs to PC Hopes, subject to detailed assessment if not agreed. Permission to appeal was refused.