Stephenson, R (on the application of) v Stockton-On-Tees Borough Council

A local authority may recover a charge for social care services at an amount it considers reasonable, subject to conventional public law review and applicable statutory guidance. A policy excluding payments to close family members from disability-related expenditure is not irrational where it is based on the usual voluntary nature of family care, the risk of fraudulent or contrived claims, and administrative practicality. The policy must, however, allow exceptions where care is provided by necessity rather than choice. A policy concerning disability-related expenditure should also adopt a rational method for treating repair costs.

The claimant, an elderly disabled tenant receiving home care support from the defendant local authority, challenged the calculation of charges for that support. The authority included her disability-related benefits as income but refused to treat £45 per week paid to her daughter for care as disability-related expenditure under its family member rule.

She alleged that the rule was irrational, infringed her rights under article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, and amounted to unlawful racial discrimination because exceptions were recognised for cultural reasons. She also challenged the authority’s treatment of disability-related equipment and repair costs. The central issues were whether the family member rule was lawful and whether the authority’s expenditure calculations were irrational.

1. Charge-setting framework. Under section 17(1) of the Health and Social Services and Social Security Adjudications Act 1983, the authority could recover such charge as it considered reasonable. The amount selected was reviewable only on conventional public law grounds. Section 7(1) of the Local Authority Social Services Act 1970 required the authority to act under the Secretary of State’s general guidance, while permitting departure for good reason without taking a substantially different course.
2. Family member rule. The exclusion of payments to close family members was not irrational. The authority was entitled to proceed on the basis that close family care was normally voluntary and unpaid, and that a payment chosen by the disabled person for care which would otherwise have been provided without charge was not necessarily disability-related expenditure. The rule also served legitimate administrative purposes, including reducing fraudulent or contrived claims and avoiding inconsistent treatment between paid and unpaid family care.
3. The authority’s policy was not an inflexible blanket prohibition. Exceptions could be made where the care was provided from necessity rather than choice, including cases involving genuine cultural or other exceptional circumstances. The authority was entitled to assume that the claimant’s payment was voluntary because neither she nor her daughter had stated otherwise.
4. Human rights and discrimination. The rule did not prevent family care or interfere with family relationships and therefore did not breach article 8(1). Even if article 8 was engaged, the rule could be justified under article 8(2). The cultural exception did not constitute unlawful discrimination under Part III of the Race Relations Act 1976, and section 35 in any event provided a complete answer.
5. Equipment and repairs. There was no evidential basis for finding irrational the authority’s ten-year estimate for the equipment’s lifespan. A separate challenge to repair-cost treatment was not formally before the court, but the judge considered that amortising repair costs over the equipment’s estimated lifetime was arguably irrational and that the authority might need to reconsider its approach.
6. The claim for judicial review was dismissed. The parties were invited to agree costs, with any unresolved issue to be determined by the judge without a hearing.