Attorney General v Durlacher

Under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981, the court may make a civil proceedings order where a person has habitually and consistently, without reasonable ground, instituted vexatious civil proceedings. The court must consider the history of proceedings in the round. Where the evidence appears sufficient for such an order but the respondent cannot attend because of serious illness, the application may be adjourned and an interim injunction granted under section 37(1), in terms corresponding to the proposed civil proceedings order, pending further order.

The Attorney General applied for a civil proceedings order against the defendant under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. Evidence identified 19 unsuccessful proceedings brought by the defendant against various persons between 1994 and 2002, many having been struck out for disclosing no reasonable cause of action or similar defects. The defendant was unable to attend because he was seriously ill with prostate cancer. The court therefore considered whether to adjourn the application and impose interim restrictions pending any further hearing.

1. The evidence of 19 unsuccessful proceedings, considered in the round, made it highly probable that the statutory conditions for a civil proceedings order under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 were satisfied. The defendant’s acknowledgment of service, including reference to a further action commenced in 2003, provided no persuasive reason against the order.
2. Because the defendant was seriously ill and unable to attend, the application was adjourned. The court did not finally determine the application for a civil proceedings order.
3. Pending further order, the appropriate interim measure was an interlocutory injunction under section 37(1) of the Supreme Court Act 1981. The injunction was made in the same terms as an order under section 42(1)(a), and remained in force until further order, with liberty to apply.
4. The Treasury Solicitor was directed to inform the court office of the position after six months and, if necessary, at six-monthly intervals. No order for costs was sought.

Not stated in the judgment.