General Medical Council, R (on the application of) v George

When deciding whether to extend an interim suspension of a medical practitioner’s registration, the court exercises a discretion. It must balance the protection of the public and the public interest against the practitioner’s interests, including the ability to work and the right to a fair trial. Where a lawful professional performance assessment is imminent, and the practitioner’s suspension prevents no material opportunity for assessment, it may be proportionate to continue the suspension until the assessment and its immediate consequences can be considered. The extension should be no longer than reasonably necessary, and should allow for subsequent review.

The General Medical Council applied under section 41A(6) of the Medical Act 1983 for a further 12-month extension of an interim suspension imposed on a paediatrician’s registration. The suspension had followed concerns about professional performance and conduct. An Assessment Referral Committee had directed a performance assessment, which had been delayed but was due to take place shortly. The defendant argued that the Interim Orders Committee had erred and that continued suspension was unfair and disproportionate. The court had to decide whether, and for how long, the suspension should be extended.

The application was granted in part. The interim suspension was extended for six months, rather than the 12 months sought, and the defendant was ordered to pay the GMC’s costs, summarily assessed at £3,000.

1. Under section 41A(6) of the Medical Act 1983, the court has a discretion whether to extend an interim suspension order. The relevant exercise is to determine whether continued suspension is fair, reasonable and proportionate, balancing the protection of the public and the public interest against the practitioner’s interests, including the ability to work and the right to a fair trial.
2. The court may take a different view from the Interim Orders Committee, but there must be evidence capable of showing that the Committee’s assessment was wrong. No such evidence had been provided.
3. The Assessment Referral Committee’s decision that the defendant’s professional performance should be assessed had not been challenged. In those circumstances, permitting the defendant to resume practice before the assessment was completed would be irresponsible in the interests of both the public and the defendant.
4. The appropriate period was one sufficient to permit the assessment, the assessors’ reports, the defendant’s response, and the case coordinator’s consideration of the material. Six months was appropriate because it allowed those steps to occur while remaining subject to the Interim Orders Committee’s review within three months.
5. The statutory obligation to apply for an extension did not justify making no order for costs. The defendant’s unreasonable refusal to engage constructively on a suitable timescale meant that the GMC should recover the bulk of its costs, subject to a modest reduction reflecting the shorter extension and the possibility of a consent order.