Crown Prosecution Service, R (on the application of) v Blaydon Youth Court

A magistrates’ court has power to try separate informations together where that course is in the interests of justice. That power is not excluded merely because the informations charge alternative offences arising from the same facts. The defendant’s consent is unnecessary, although any objection is a relevant factor. The absence of a statutory power to return an alternative verdict does not require separate trials where the alternative offences are separately charged. The court can avoid inappropriate double convictions by appropriate orders concerning the lesser charge or sentence.

A 17-year-old defendant faced two informations arising from the same incident: one alleging a racially aggravated public order offence and the other alleging the basic offence. The prosecution sought a joint trial. The Youth Court considered that trying both charges would be duplicitous and required the prosecution to elect between them.

On an application for judicial review, permission having been granted by Leveson J, the central issue was whether a magistrates’ court could jointly try separately laid alternative informations.

1. Power to try informations together. The court accepted that magistrates’ courts have power to try two or more informations together where it is in the interests of justice. The defendant’s consent is not a necessary condition, although any defence objection is relevant. This followed Chief Constable of Norfolk v Clayton (1983) 2 AC 473.
2. Alternative charges. That power extends to separate informations charging alternative offences arising from the same facts. Rule 12 of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules 1981 concerns duplicity within a single information. It does not prevent the joint trial of two informations which are not themselves duplicitous. The statutory provisions concerning alternative verdicts on indictment do not alter that conclusion. They address verdicts for offences not expressly charged, whereas the basic offence was expressly charged by a separate information.
3. Avoiding double convictions. There was no inherent injustice in a joint trial. Under Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980, section 10, the lesser charge could be adjourned sine die. Alternatively, an absolute discharge could be used, although the court cautioned against doing so before the time for appealing against the more serious conviction had expired. The approach was supported by Director of Public Prosecutions v Gane [1991] Crim LR 711, R v Cole (1965) 2 QB 388 and R v Bebbington (1978) 67 Cr App R 285.
4. The Youth Court had misunderstood the law. In the circumstances, refusing a joint trial was also perverse because separate trials would create unnecessary expense and inconvenience for the defendant, witnesses and court. The decision was quashed and a joint trial of the two informations was ordered. Mrs Justice Hallett agreed.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On judicial review, the Youth Court’s decision was quashed and a joint trial of the two informations was ordered. Permission had been granted by Leveson J.