Jones v Director of Public Prosecutions

A keeper responding to a requirement under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 may provide the required information in a signed letter cross-referenced to the form. The keeper need not complete the prescribed form where the written response contains all the information requested. The position may differ where the response is given orally despite a reasonable requirement for written information. A credibility finding under section 172(4) is unsafe where it substantially depends on the erroneous conclusion that the keeper failed to comply with the required form.

The claimant, the keeper of a vehicle detected speeding, was convicted by a deputy district judge of failing to provide information identifying the driver under section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988. He had returned the notice without completing or signing the form, but had enclosed a signed letter stating that he had not been driving and could not identify which authorised driver had been driving.

On an appeal by way of case stated, the Divisional Court considered the admissibility and legal effect of the letter, the statutory defence under section 172(4), and whether the conviction could stand despite the deputy district judge’s adverse credibility findings.

1. Appeal allowed. The conviction was quashed and the matter was returned to the deputy district judge with a direction to acquit. The prosecution did not seek a retrial.
2. The letter and the claimant’s reference to it on the returned form were admissible. Although the police may reasonably require information to be supplied in writing and in a specified form, a signed written response containing all the information required by the form was, in substance, compliance with section 172(2) of the Road Traffic Act 1988. The claimant was not at fault merely because he had not written the information directly into the form.
3. The decisions in DPP v Broomfield (2002) EWHC 1962 (Admin) and Boss v Measures (1990) RTR 26 concerned attempts to provide information orally, despite a reasonable requirement for a written response. They did not require the claimant’s signed letter to be disregarded or treated as non-compliance.
4. The remaining issue was whether the claimant established the defence in section 172(4): that he did not know and could not, with reasonable diligence, have ascertained who was driving. The deputy district judge was entitled in principle to assess credibility, but the stated reasons showed that the adverse credibility finding substantially depended on the mistaken view that the claimant had acted unlawfully by not completing the form.
5. The absence of supporting witnesses could not, of itself, be treated as positive damage to credibility. Because the material error infected the credibility assessment and the conviction, the court rejected the submission that the conviction could nevertheless be upheld on the oral evidence alone.
6. The court ordered £1,450 costs from central funds, subject to liberty for the paying authorities to apply to the magistrates’ court concerning assessment.

• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal by way of case stated was allowed. The conviction was quashed and the deputy district judge was directed to acquit.
• Cardiff magistrates’ court: The deputy district judge convicted the claimant under section 172(3) of the Road Traffic Act 1988 and imposed a fine, costs and three penalty points.