Murphy v The Ethical Standards Officer of the Standards Board for England

A councillor has a personal interest where a council decision might reasonably be regarded as affecting his well-being more than that of other local people. Well-being is context-dependent and extends beyond financial or material interests. A prejudicial interest arises where an informed member of the public would regard the interest as sufficiently significant to be likely to prejudice the councillor’s judgment of the public interest. A councillor with such an interest must disclose it, withdraw and refrain from improperly influencing the decision. Suspension may be imposed, but the sanction must reflect the circumstances, including whether the interest was openly known and whether confusing official advice materially mitigated the breach.

The appellant, a borough councillor, had been named and criticised in an Ombudsman’s report concerning his participation in a planning matter. When the Council considered the Monitoring Officer’s report on that matter, he remained, spoke and abstained from voting despite advice that he should withdraw. A case tribunal found breaches of the Council’s Code of Conduct and suspended him for one year.

He appealed under section 79(15) of the Local Government Act 2000, challenging the construction of well-being, the findings of personal and prejudicial interest, alleged breaches of the European Convention on Human Rights, and the proportionality of the sanction.

1. The findings of breach were upheld. The phrase well-being in paragraph 5.1.3.1 of the Code could not sensibly be reduced to a single definition. Its meaning depended on context and included matters affecting quality of life, reputation and personal satisfaction, whether or not financial. The provision was intended to prevent councillors misusing their positions for personal interests. [14]-[16]
2. The tribunal was entitled to conclude that the appellant had a personal interest. He alone had been named and criticised in the Ombudsman’s report, and an informed outsider could reasonably regard a council decision about the report as affecting his well-being more than that of other local people. The relevant facts were those revealed by the report and relevant to the Council’s response, rather than the underlying facts of the planning dispute. [17]-[19]
3. The tribunal had also applied the prejudicial-interest test correctly. It was entitled to conclude that an informed member of the public would regard the appellant’s interest as sufficiently significant to be likely to prejudice his judgment of the public interest. His presence, speech and failure to withdraw breached paragraphs 5.1.3.3, 5.1.3.8(a) and 5.1.3.8(c) of the Code.
4. The human-rights arguments failed. There was no denial of a fair hearing under article 6. The tribunal had to determine the issue from the primary facts, and the appellant had been able to make submissions and could have sought to call evidence. Article 8 was not engaged because the issue was an objective one concerning what might reasonably be regarded as affecting well-being, not an inquiry into private feelings. Any restriction on expression under article 10 was justified by the need to protect public confidence in local authority decision-making and was not drawn too widely. [20]-[27]
5. The appeal against the one-year suspension succeeded in part. The tribunal had not given sufficient weight to the unusual fact that the appellant’s interest was known to everyone, the confusing and conflicting advice he had received, his long public service and the absence of any challenge to his integrity. The suspension was quashed and replaced by a suspension for four months. Costs were left for agreement or written submissions. [28]-[33]

The judgment describes an appeal to the High Court under section 79(15) of the Local Government Act 2000 from the decision of a case tribunal, which had found breaches of the Council’s Code of Conduct and imposed a one-year suspension. The High Court dismissed the appeal against the findings but allowed it against the sanction, substituting a four-month suspension.