Hastings Borough Council, R (on the application of) v Jones

On a prosecutor’s appeal by case stated against an acquittal, the High Court determines whether the magistrates’ decision was wrong in law, not whether another bench might have reached a different factual conclusion. The relevant question is whether the decision was reasonably open on the evidence. Where the prosecution must prove that the defendant knew a statement was false, a reasonable possibility that the defendant misunderstood what had to be disclosed prevents conviction. Evidence that a witness who allegedly caused the misunderstanding was not called is ordinarily no more than an absence of corroboration. The court must not speculate about the reason for that absence. An Administrative Court judge has discretion over costs on such an appeal and may order an unsuccessful prosecutor to pay the respondent’s costs where the appeal was bound to fail.

Hastings Borough Council prosecuted Doreen Jones on six informations alleging offences under section 112(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992. The magistrates acquitted her, finding that she had not realised that the benefit forms required her to disclose both employments. The Council appealed by case stated and sought an extension of time for service of its appellant’s notice.

The central issues were whether the acquittals were legally perverse on the evidence, and whether the Administrative Court should order the Council to pay Mrs Jones’s costs despite her public funding.

1. Extension of time. The Council’s 15-day delay in serving the appellant’s notice was excused. Mrs Jones suffered no disadvantage, and the short delay resulted from inexperience. The appeal was considered on its merits.
2. Scope of the appeal. Under section 111(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980, an appeal from an acquittal lies only for error of law or excess of jurisdiction. The question posed as whether the decision was reasonable was treated as asking whether it was reasonably open to the justices on the evidence. Different benches may reach different conclusions on the same facts without either decision being legally unreasonable.
3. Knowledge and falsity. Section 112(1) of the Social Security Administration Act 1992 does not make dishonesty an independent element. However, following Harrison v Department of Social Security (CO/1244/96), the prosecution had to establish that Mrs Jones knew the omitted employment was material to the benefit application and knew that she was required to disclose it. Her evidence provided a basis on which the justices could doubt that she had such knowledge.
4. Evidence and perversity. The fact that the person who allegedly advised Mrs Jones was not called did not entitle the justices to speculate about why he was absent. It meant only that her account lacked corroboration. The other evidence did not make her account necessarily untrue, so the acquittals were reasonably open to the justices. The appeal by case stated was dismissed.
5. Costs. Part VI.1.6 of the Practice Direction on costs in criminal proceedings gave the Administrative Court complete discretion over costs between the parties. In the alternative, if costs could be ordered against an unsuccessful prosecutor only where the appeal was brought unreasonably, this appeal met that threshold because it was bound to fail once the case stated was properly considered. The Council was ordered to pay Mrs Jones’s costs of the appeal, including any costs of addressing the extension-of-time application. No Legal Aid taxation was required.

High Court (Administrative Court): The magistrates’ acquittals were upheld on the Council’s appeal by case stated. The appeal was dismissed, and the Council was ordered to pay Mrs Jones’s costs.