Harrison, R (on the application of) v Flintshire Magistrates' Court

Exceptional delay does not necessarily defeat judicial review where refusal of relief would perpetuate a serious injustice, particularly in relation to an excessive criminal sentence. A conviction remains lawful where the defendant was guilty of an offence created by the applicable statutory provision, even though the summons identified the wrong provision imposing the speed limit, provided the magistrates had jurisdiction and could have amended the charge. The appropriate remedy may be to quash the sentence rather than the conviction and remit the case to the magistrates under Magistrates' Courts Act 1980, section 142(1), so that the sentence can be reconsidered in the interests of justice.

The claimant pleaded guilty before the magistrates to driving on a restricted road above 30 miles per hour. The road was in fact subject to the national speed limit, and the police later notified affected motorists that the charges would be withdrawn. The claimant brought judicial review proceedings approximately 17 and a half months after learning of the error. She sought to quash her conviction, arguing that she had been prosecuted under an inapplicable speed-limit provision. The central issues were whether delay should bar relief, whether the conviction was lawful, and what remedy was appropriate.

1. Delay. The delay was substantially attributable to administrative failures by the claimant's solicitors and exceeded a reasonable period by approximately 14 and a half months. Ordinarily, such delay could justify refusing relief. However, the court balanced the delay against the substantial injustice caused by the excessive penalty. Where an unjust criminal sentence has been imposed, it may be appropriate to grant relief despite lengthy delay, particularly where no administrative difficulty or prejudice is shown.
2. Lawfulness of the conviction. The claimant was charged under sections 81(1) and 89(1) of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984. Although section 81 was not the provision imposing the applicable speed limit, section 89(1) created the offence of driving above a speed limit imposed by or under an enactment to which it applied. The claimant was, in substance, guilty of that offence. The summons could have been amended before the plea, and the magistrates had jurisdiction to accept the plea and impose sentence.
3. Remedy. It would not be just to quash the conviction because the claimant had committed a speeding offence and the court was entitled to impose a penalty. The proper relief was to quash the sentence and remit the matter to the magistrates to reopen the case under section 142(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. The magistrates could take account of the 42-day disqualification and resulting financial loss when deciding whether to reduce or remove the fine. The question of endorsement, including whether exceptional circumstances justified departing from the usual three points, was for the magistrates.
4. The costs issue was left to be determined according to whether the claimant sought a formal order, with the judge indicating that the solicitors' unreasonable delay would inform the exercise of discretion.

The judgment describes the claimant's conviction and sentence by the North Wales Magistrates' Court, sitting at Mold, on 4 July 2002. The Administrative Court granted judicial review in part by quashing the sentence and remitting the matter to the magistrates for reconsideration under section 142(1) of the Magistrates' Courts Act 1980. The conviction was not quashed.