Dartford Borough Council, R (on the application of) v First Secretary of State & Anor

Inappropriate development in the Green Belt may be justified by very special circumstances arising from the combined effect of local need for gypsy sites and highly particular personal circumstances, including special educational needs. Whether the circumstances meet that threshold is ordinarily a matter of planning judgment for the decision-maker. A permission may properly be personal to an extended family where the case was presented on that basis, the family’s circumstances are closely connected, and no obvious planning advantage requires a smaller site. The decision-maker need not investigate or give reasons for a fallback case that the claimant did not raise, provided the material considerations have been addressed and the reasoning is adequate.

Dartford Borough Council applied under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 to quash the Secretary of State’s decision granting permanent planning permission for a six-caravan gypsy site in the Green Belt. An earlier decision had been quashed because it failed to address temporary permission. On redetermination, the Secretary of State relied particularly on the special educational needs of the second defendant’s children, together with the unmet local need for gypsy sites, and granted personal permission for the three related families. The Council challenged the adequacy of the evidence and reasons, and the breadth of the personal permission.

1. Application dismissed. The Secretary of State had adequate material and reasons to conclude that very special circumstances clearly outweighed the Green Belt harm.
2. The unmet need for gypsy sites did not, by itself, amount to a very special circumstance. Combined with the personal circumstances identified, however, it was capable of doing so. The final evaluation was a matter for the Secretary of State’s planning judgment. The court emphasised that the decision-maker is often uniquely placed to assess whether circumstances are very special.
3. The case was materially different from R (Chelmsford BC) v The First Secretary of State and Draper [2003] EWHC 2978 Admin. That decision did not establish that children’s educational needs could not normally amount to very special circumstances. It established, on its facts, that ordinary educational needs could not meet the threshold where they were the only factor relied upon. Here, detailed evidence identified special educational needs and the likely serious consequences of disrupting the children’s education.
4. The Council had not challenged the evidence by suggesting that alternative schools or provision could meet the children’s needs. The Secretary of State was therefore entitled to rely on the material before him and was not required to address issues which the Council had not raised.
5. The personal permission for the three families was not irrational or inadequately reasoned. The proposal had consistently been presented as an extended-family site for six caravans. Once particular needs were shown in one family, and absent contrary representations or an obvious planning reason to reduce the number of caravans, it was reasonable to consider whether the extended family should remain together. The decision was fact-sensitive and did not establish a general rule that one family’s circumstances justify permission for unrelated families.
6. The Council’s concern about precedent did not alter the result. It had not advanced a fallback case for two caravans or for permission limited to one family, and the Secretary of State was not obliged to devise and determine such a case himself. The Council was ordered to pay the first defendant’s costs, summarily assessed at £5,950; the second defendant’s publicly funded costs were subject to detailed assessment. Permission to appeal was refused.

The judgment records that an earlier Secretary of State decision in the same dispute had been quashed by Mr Justice Harrison on 16 December 2003 because it failed to address whether temporary permission should be granted. On redetermination, the Secretary of State granted permanent permission. The Administrative Court dismissed the renewed section 288 challenge and refused permission to appeal.