Blench v DPP

Police officers may enter premises without a warrant under Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, section 17(1)(e), where the circumstances reasonably indicate that entry is required to save life or limb. That statutory power is not defeated by a resident’s withdrawal of any implied licence to approach the property. A breach of the peace may consist of actual harm or a reasonable apprehension of imminent harm. Where aggressive conduct and obstruction create that apprehension, arrest may be lawful and the officer remains in the execution of his duty. The special safeguards identified in Lesley Edward Bibby v Chief Constable of Essex Police apply where the anticipated breach follows lawful conduct by the person detained, not where that person has himself committed an unlawful breach or obstruction. A delay in informing an arrested person of a further ground of arrest does not retrospectively invalidate earlier lawful detention.

The appellant was convicted by the Luton and South Bedfordshire justices of assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty, contrary to section 89 of the Police Act 1996. Police officers had attended his home following an emergency call concerning a drunken man attempting to remove a child. The appellant acted aggressively, obstructed the officers’ attempt to enter under section 17(1)(e) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, and later spat at a constable after being arrested to prevent a breach of the peace.

By case stated, the appellant challenged the sufficiency of the evidence, the officers’ right to enter, the lawfulness of the arrest and detention, and the delay in informing him of the later assault arrest. The central issues were whether the officers acted lawfully and in the execution of their duty when the assault occurred.

1. Appeal dismissed. The justices were entitled to reject the submission of no case to answer and to convict. The evidence supported findings that the officers acted lawfully and that the appellant deliberately assaulted PC Parsons.
2. Section 17(1)(e) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 gave the officers a lawful right to enter and search the premises without a warrant to save life or limb. The emergency call, including the report that a drunken man was taking a child and the uncertainty created by a voice in the background, justified the exercise of that discretion. The power operated independently of the implied licence to approach a front door. Any revocation of that licence therefore did not make the officers trespassers.
3. The appellant’s aggressive and intimidating conduct, his threats to exclude the officers, and the trapping of an officer’s arm in the door provided abundant evidence of an existing breach of the peace and a reasonable apprehension that harm would imminently recur. His arrest to prevent that recurrence was lawful. PC Parsons was consequently acting in the execution of his duty when the appellant spat at him.
4. The six conditions discussed in Lesley Edward Bibby v Chief Constable of Essex Police did not arise. Those conditions protect a person whose lawful conduct has provoked a possible breach of the peace. They were irrelevant where the appellant had himself committed a serious breach of the peace and obstructed officers in the execution of their duty.
5. Section 28(3) of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 did not invalidate the detention. Where it is impracticable to give the ground of arrest immediately, detention may continue until communication becomes possible. A later failure to give the reason timeously would breach the provision but would not retrospectively affect what had already occurred. Here the appellant was informed that he was arrested to prevent a further breach of the peace.

1. Luton and South Bedfordshire justices: convicted the appellant on 8 April 2004 of assaulting a police constable in the execution of his duty.
2. High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal by way of case stated and answered the justices’ questions against the appellant.