Director of Public Prosecutions v Patterson

Whether possession of an offensive weapon per se is supported by a reasonable excuse under section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 is ordinarily a question for the tribunal of fact. The statutory words are broad and are not confined to cases involving self-defence, necessity or an immediate use for an innocent purpose. The circumstances may make a successful defence rare, particularly where the weapon is inherently dangerous, but they do not justify imposing a narrower legal test. The relevant time is when the defendant is found in possession. A butterfly knife is an offensive weapon per se, and possession places a heavy burden on the defendant. Nevertheless, magistrates may find a reasonable excuse where the evidential findings support that conclusion.

The Director of Public Prosecutions appealed by way of case stated from the decision of South-East Hampshire Magistrates sitting at Portsmouth on 7 April 2004. The magistrates dismissed a charge that Philip Robert Patterson possessed a butterfly knife, an offensive weapon, in a public place contrary to section 1 of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953.

The magistrates accepted that Patterson had intended to use the knife to open horse feed and hay or straw, and that he had been unable to leave it at his father’s shop as originally intended. They concluded that he had a reasonable excuse. The questions for the Divisional Court were whether that excuse was capable of being reasonable and whether the magistrates were entitled to acquit him on the facts found.

1. The appeal was dismissed. The magistrates were entitled to conclude that Patterson’s excuse was capable of being a reasonable excuse and that he was not guilty on the facts found.
2. There is a distinction between an article which is an offensive weapon per se and an article which becomes an offensive weapon because the person possessing it intends it to be used to cause injury. A butterfly knife is an offensive weapon per se. The defendant bears a very heavy burden in showing an innocent purpose capable of amounting to reasonable excuse.
3. The words “reasonable excuse” in section 1(1) of the Prevention of Crime Act 1953 are of wide purport. They give the jury or magistrates a discretion to determine the issue on the facts. The statutory defence cannot be restricted by a judicial rule that excludes every purpose other than self-defence or necessity.
4. The relevant time for assessing reasonable excuse is when the defendant is found in possession. The magistrates were entitled to consider the intended journey, the short period of possession, the intended use of the knife for the horses, and the failed plan to leave it at the shop.
5. R v Densu established that lack of knowledge that an item was an offensive weapon is irrelevant to reasonable excuse. It did not establish the wider proposition that possession for work or another innocent purpose can never constitute reasonable excuse. Observations suggesting that work could not provide such an excuse required qualification.
6. The court noted that successful reliance on reasonable excuse for an offensive weapon per se would be exceedingly rare absent necessity or an immediate temporal connection between possession and the innocent purpose. That observation did not convert those circumstances into an exclusive legal test.

• High Court (Administrative Court): On an appeal by way of case stated, the court dismissed the Director of Public Prosecutions’ appeal and upheld the magistrates’ acquittal.
• South-East Hampshire Magistrates, Portsmouth: On 7 April 2004, the magistrates found that the defendant had a reasonable excuse and dismissed the charge.