Dacre Son & Hartley Ltd. v North Yorkshire Trading Standards

An information is sufficient where it describes the offence in ordinary language and gives reasonable information about the nature of the charge. The court may consider advance information and evidence already heard when deciding whether a defect caused real unfairness or prejudice. The adequacy of particulars is offence- and fact-dependent. A complaint about lack of particularity should ordinarily be raised before trial, rather than by a submission of no case to answer. Offences under section 1 of the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991 are offences of strict liability, subject to the statutory defence of due diligence.

Dacre Son & Hartley Ltd. was convicted by the Skipton Justices of two offences under section 1 of the Property Misdescriptions Act 1991 concerning statements about damp at a property marketed by the company. The company challenged the convictions by case stated.

The issues were whether the informations were defective, whether advance information and evidence could be considered when determining a no-case submission, and whether there was sufficient evidence to support the convictions.

1. Appeal dismissed. The Justices had adopted a faultless approach.
2. When an information is challenged for lack of particularity, the critical question is whether its wording created real unfairness. The court may consider relevant extraneous material, including advance information and evidence heard by the time of the challenge. Here, the prosecution’s advance information identified the representations, their author and the issue of damp, so the appellant could not have been uncertain about the case it had to meet. The position may differ where critical aspects of the prosecution case first emerge during trial.
3. Rule 100 of the Magistrates’ Court Rules 1981 requires an information to describe the specific offence in ordinary language and give particulars reasonably informing the defendant of the charge. The informations stated the statutory provision, dates, place, property and the substance of the alleged false or misleading representations. They were sufficient. The omission of the employee’s name was not fatal, particularly because the company, rather than the employee, was prosecuted.
4. The comparison with the Trade Descriptions Act 1968 was unhelpful. The necessary detail depends on the offence charged and the factual allegations supporting it. George Wimpey UK Ltd was distinguishable because it concerned an attempted expansion of the charge by late amendment.
5. The evidence was sufficient. Once the Justices accepted the prosecution evidence, it was open to them to find that the statements were false or misleading and were made in the course of the appellant’s estate agency business. The offences were matters of strict liability, subject to the due-diligence defence under section 2.
6. A defendant who genuinely considers that an information lacks particulars should normally seek better particulars before trial. A submission of no case to answer ordinarily tests the sufficiency of the evidence and is not the appropriate forum for a complaint about particulars. Costs were ordered against the appellant in the sum of £4,800.

The judgment describes an appeal by case stated from convictions imposed by the Skipton Justices on 2 December 2003. The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal and awarded costs of £4,800 against the appellant.