Merseyside Police v Reynolds

For a statutory detention period expressed in days, the day on which the detention order is made is excluded from the calculation. The final day therefore expires at midnight, unless the statute clearly provides otherwise. A procedural time requirement governing an application for continued detention is directory where its purpose is procedural and non-compliance causes no prejudice. Failure to observe that requirement does not, without more, deprive the magistrates’ court of jurisdiction or fatally invalidate the application. Applications for extensions should nevertheless be made and listed in good time before the existing detention authority expires.

The Chief Constable appealed by way of case stated from a decision of the Liverpool Justices dated 11 May 2004. The Justices had considered an application for continued detention of cash seized under sections 294 and 295 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.

The issues were whether a 90-day detention order made on 11 February expired at 10.00 am or at midnight on 11 May, and whether failure to provide seven days between service of the further application and its hearing, as contemplated by rule 5(3) of the relevant Rules, deprived the Justices of jurisdiction.

1. Appeal allowed. The order dated 11 February 2004 authorised detention until midnight on 11 May 2004. In calculating a period of 90 days beginning with the date of the order, 11 February was excluded. The time printed on Form B was helpful administratively but could not determine the statutory construction. The court relied on the approach in Marren v Dawson Bentley & Co Ltd [1961] 3 All ER 270; Radcliffe and Bartholomew [1892] 1 QB 161; and Dodds v Walker [1981] 1 WLR 1027.
2. Rule 5(3) of the Magistrates’ Courts (Detention and Forfeiture of Cash) Rules 2002 was directory, not mandatory. The court adopted the reasoning in R v (On the application of Halford) v Colchester Magistrates’ Court and treated the analogous reasoning in Crown v Luton Justices ex parte Abecasis as applicable. The absence of seven clear days did not fundamentally flaw the application or remove the Justices’ jurisdiction, particularly because the respondent was present, represented and suffered no prejudice.
3. Form A had been served appropriately. The Justices had jurisdiction to hear the application and had answered the central questions incorrectly.
4. The matter was remitted to a different Bench of Justices to consider whether an extension should be granted. Lord Justice Rose also observed that applications for extensions should be initiated and heard well before the existing detention authority expires.

1. Liverpool Justices — On 11 May 2004, held that the earlier detention order expired at 10.00 am and that the failure to comply with the seven-day period irretrievably flawed the proceedings.
2. High Court (Administrative Court) — The appeal by way of case stated was allowed. The Justices were held to have jurisdiction, and the matter was remitted to a different Bench.