Raffile v Government of the United States of America

Under the Extradition Act 2003, the appropriate judge has discretion to adjourn an extradition hearing after it has begun where proceeding would cause unfairness. The requirement that the hearing begin by the fixed date does not require it to be completed on that date.

Procedural unfairness may arise where counsel fails, through misunderstanding or neglect, to make submissions on a statutory bar at the proper stage, but the court must assess whether actual injustice resulted. Delay caused by an accused person’s flight will ordinarily not make extradition unjust or oppressive. Mental illness and suicide risk do not automatically bar extradition where the requesting state has proper procedures and the evidence does not establish the statutory threshold. A fair-trial complaint ordinarily falls to be considered by the trial court in the requesting state.

The claimant appealed under section 103 of the Extradition Act 2003 against a district judge’s decision under section 87(3) to send his case to the Secretary of State for a decision on extradition to the United States. He also sought judicial review, alleging that the refusal to adjourn the extradition hearing to obtain psychiatric evidence was procedurally unfair.

The claimant relied on mental ill-health, suicide risk, delay, Articles 2, 3, 6 and 8 of the Convention, and the statutory provisions concerning mental or physical condition. The court also considered whether submissions on passage of time had been wrongly excluded and whether judicial review was necessary.

1. Appeal and judicial review. The appeal was dismissed and leave to apply for judicial review was refused. The statutory appeal jurisdiction was wide enough to address the alleged procedural unfairness and the refusal to adjourn.
2. Adjournment. Section 76 required the hearing to begin by the fixed date, not to be completed by that date. The district judge therefore had power, under section 77(1), to proceed with such initial stages as were possible and adjourn part-heard if continuing would be unfair. If the district judge had treated section 76 as depriving him of that jurisdiction, he would have erred. However, his later refusal to adjourn was a merits-based exercise of discretion, and was within the proper margin of judgment.
3. Psychiatric evidence and Convention rights. The later psychiatric report did not alter the result. Even had it been available, the district judge would have reached the same conclusion. The evidence did not establish a real risk of violation of Articles 2 or 3. The requesting authorities were aware of the suicide risk and had previously managed it. Any interference with family life under Article 8 would have been proportionate.
4. Fair trial. A complaint based on adverse publicity did not establish the necessary risk that the claimant could not receive a fair trial. The United States accepted the obligation of a fair trial, and the practical means of securing it were matters for the trial court.
5. Passage of time and mental condition. Any delay was substantially attributable to the claimant’s flight, so extradition was not unjust or oppressive under section 82. His condition did not reach the seriousness required by section 91, and requiring him to undergo trial and sentence was not oppressive.
6. Any outstanding issue concerning technical amendment of the charges could be raised by the United States within 14 days. Costs were dealt with under the claimant’s representation orders.

The judgment records an appeal from the decision of District Judge Pratt at Bow Street Magistrates’ Court on 9 August 2004. The district judge sent the case to the Secretary of State under section 87(3) of the Extradition Act 2003. The Divisional Court dismissed the statutory appeal and refused judicial review.