Bloom v HM Assistant Deputy Coroner for the Northern District of London & Anor

An application to quash an inquest may succeed where new evidence means that the original inquiry might have reached a different verdict. It is unnecessary to show that a new inquest would probably do so. The family is entitled to a full inquiry into how and why the death occurred, and the fact that relevant questions could have been raised at the original inquest is not decisive. The statutory power is freestanding and must be exercised where a further inquest is necessary or desirable in the interests of justice.

Bernard Bloom applied, with the Attorney General’s authority, under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988 to quash an inquest into the death of his sister, Carmel Bloom, and for a new inquest. The original inquest concluded that she had died from natural causes after developing septicaemia following treatment for a kidney stone.

The application relied on later expert evidence concerning the adequacy of her resuscitation and treatment, the cause of the cardiac arrest, and whether death might have been avoided. The central issues were whether the coroner’s inquiry had been inadequate and whether the new evidence made a further inquest necessary or desirable in the interests of justice.

1. Application allowed. The original inquest was quashed and a new inquest was ordered before a different tribunal. There was no order for costs.
2. The coroner was not criticised for the conduct of the original inquest. He had obtained evidence covering the relevant period, was entitled not to call Dr Darko, and was not required on these facts to obtain independent expert evidence. The family had possessed a strongly critical report before the inquest but had not asked for its author to be called or supplied it to the coroner.
3. The scope of an inquest is governed by Rule 36 of the Coroners Rules. Following R (Middleton) v West Somerset Coroner & Anr [2004] UKHL 10, the question how the deceased came by his death may include the circumstances in which the death occurred. Rule 36(2) and Rule 42 continue to prevent findings of criminal or civil liability, although relevant acts and omissions may be recorded.
4. The power under section 13 of the Coroners Act 1988 is freestanding. Under In re Rapier (deceased) [1988] QB 26, it is unnecessary to establish that a new inquest would reach a different verdict; it is sufficient that it might do so.
5. The later evidence raised both a possible finding of neglect and a substantial issue about the cause of death. The original inquest had been influenced by evidence suggesting that death was almost inevitable. In light of the later expert evidence, the family had not received the full inquiry into how and why the death occurred to which it was entitled. A new inquest was therefore necessary or desirable in the interests of justice.

The judgment describes the original inquest, held without a jury on 5 August 2003, which concluded that the deceased had died from natural causes. The Administrative Court quashed that inquest and ordered a new inquest before a different tribunal.