Heidleberg Graphic Equipment Ltd. & Anor v Hogan & Ors

A person who knows of a court order cannot deliberately obstruct its execution or direct another person to do so. A non-party may be liable for contempt where the order is known and the person is in responsible control of the premises or deliberately assists its breach. Coercion by a spouse, without threats approaching physical violence, does not amount to a defence to contempt. Temporary restrictions on telephone communications in a search order may be justified under Articles 8 and 10 where necessary to prevent tipping off and protect the rights of others. Serious breaches warrant significant sanctions, although prompt, albeit belated, compliance and the purging of contempt may affect sentence.

The claimants sought to commit Mr and Mrs Hogan for contempt arising from breaches of a search and seizure order made by Park J. The order required access to premises, prohibited specified communications and dealings with listed materials, and imposed information and disclosure obligations. A freezing order was also made against Mr Hogan.

During execution of the order, Mrs Hogan refused access, made and received telephone calls, and informed Mr Hogan of the order. Mr Hogan entered or controlled the premises, removed listed materials, directed Mrs Hogan not to permit the search, and refused access. The central issues were whether the alleged breaches were established, whether coercion or Convention rights provided a defence, whether Mr Hogan was liable despite not initially being a party or formally served, and what sanctions were appropriate.

1. Mrs Hogan. The court found beyond reasonable doubt that she repeatedly refused access and the search, knowing of the court order and the risk of imprisonment, fine or sequestration. Her husband’s instructions did not amount to coercion capable of providing a defence. Any relevance of coercion was confined to mitigation.
2. Her unauthorised telephone calls and disclosure of the order were also established. The restrictions were temporary, contained a legal-advice exception, and were necessary to prevent tipping off and protect the claimants’ rights. They were therefore compatible with Articles 8 and 10. The failure immediately to provide information and the late affidavit were technical breaches, while the allegation that she conspired with Mr Hogan to remove materials was not proved.
3. Mr Hogan. Although not initially served, he knew that a court order was being executed. He was in responsible control of the premises and directly refused access. In any event, his instruction to Mrs Hogan not to permit the search made him a participant in her contempt. His removal of listed materials, with knowledge of the order, was calculated to frustrate its purpose and constituted contempt.
4. There had been a technical breach of the freezing-order disclosure obligations and delay in business disclosure, but the court did not make further substantive findings on the adequacy of the later disclosure. The parties’ belated compliance and delivery of materials were relevant to sentence.
5. Contempt was established against both respondents to the extent identified. Mrs Hogan was not imprisoned or fined, having suffered arrest and custody and having been substantially the instrument of her husband. Mr Hogan narrowly avoided imprisonment but was fined £5,000.