Handa, R (on the application of) v Bow Street Magistrates' Court & Anor

On an appeal under the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court may allow the appeal only where the appropriate judge ought to have answered an issue differently and that answer would have required discharge. A decision to proceed with an extradition hearing rather than adjourn it does not itself require discharge. The court may extend the required extradition period to accommodate a person’s outstanding domestic sentence. Where both parties seek an adjournment, domestic law provides no mechanism for interrupting the sentence for extradition, and delay may create difficulty under the statutory time limits, refusal to adjourn may be irrational. That issue need not be determined where a subsequent extension removes the practical consequences of the decision.

Mr Handa was serving a domestic sentence when the High Instance Court of Paris sought his extradition on a Part 1 warrant under the Extradition Act 2003. The District Judge refused the parties’ joint request to adjourn the extradition hearing until the domestic sentence had been served, and ordered extradition.

Mr Handa brought an appeal under section 26 and judicial review proceedings, alleging that the refusal to adjourn was irrational. The central issues were whether the appeal could succeed when the alleged error did not require discharge, whether the required extradition period could be extended, and whether section 34 excluded judicial review.

1. The appeal was dismissed. Under section 27 of the Extradition Act 2003, the High Court could allow the appeal only if the District Judge ought to have decided a question differently and, on the correct decision, would have been required to order Mr Handa’s discharge. A decision not to adjourn the hearing until the end of domestic custody would not have required discharge. The statutory condition for allowing the appeal was therefore not satisfied.
2. The court agreed under section 36(3)(b) to extend the required period for extradition. The possible statutory bars, including incompatibility with Convention rights, were not expected to arise during the short period before the anticipated release from domestic custody.
3. Field J considered that the refusal to adjourn was irrational on ordinary Wednesbury principles. The issuing authority and Mr Handa both sought an adjournment. UK law contained no provision permitting domestic custody to be interrupted for extradition. The issuing authority would consequently face manifest difficulty in showing reasonable cause for delay under section 35, while there were no weighty reasons against adjournment. In those circumstances, granting the adjournment was the only reasonable decision.
4. The court also observed that the legislative omission undermined sections 37 and 186. Sections 259 and 260 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 provided for removal in asylum and immigration cases, but no equivalent provision existed for extradition cases.
5. Because the extension of the required period reversed the practical consequences said to make the refusal irrational, no order was made on the judicial review application. The court expressly left unresolved whether section 34 precluded judicial review of a decision under Part 1.

• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the appeal against the extradition order, agreed to extend the required extradition period under section 36(3)(b), and made no order on the judicial review application.
• Bow Street Magistrates' Court: the District Judge refused to adjourn the extradition hearing and ordered extradition under Part 1 of the Extradition Act 2003.