C v East Sussex County Council

A statement of special educational needs must specify not only the child’s needs and the objectives of provision, but also the means by which those objectives are to be achieved. Without that information, it may be impossible to assess whether the named school and education authority are complying with the statement.

Reasons need not be elaborated in statutory language. Decisions should be read in the context of the issues disputed by the parties, and courts should avoid dissecting them with excessive technicality. A tribunal may adopt a proportionate provision between competing expert and educational views where the basis for its conclusion is apparent.

The claimant appealed under section 11 of the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992 against a SENDIST decision concerning her son L’s statement of special educational needs. The dispute concerned whether L should attend Moor House School, a private specialist school, or Peacehaven School, a maintained mainstream school with specialist facilities.

The appeal also challenged the adequacy of the statement’s provision for L’s motor skills difficulties and speech and language disorder. The central questions were whether Part 3 sufficiently specified occupational therapy and whether SENDIST had given adequate reasons for its provision of direct speech and language therapy.

1. Occupational therapy. Part 3 of a statement must do more than identify the objective of addressing a child’s special educational needs. It must contain at least some specification of the means by which that objective is to be achieved. The statement failed to identify what occupational therapy was required for L’s significant motor skills deficit. It was therefore defective because there was no legal measure against which the provision could be assessed or enforced.
2. Speech and language therapy. The challenge to SENDIST’s decision to provide one hour of direct therapist input per week, including time working with the school, failed. The tribunal had considered the competing evidence, rejected both the authority’s position and the parents’ request for three half-hour individual sessions, and adopted a compromise appropriate to the commencement of secondary education. The basis of its decision was sufficiently apparent, and no further exposition of reasons was required.
3. Reading tribunal decisions. Per Mr Justice Moses, the principles identified by Beatson J in R (on the application of L) v London Borough of Waltham Forest and another [2003] EWHC 2907 (Admin) did not require the tribunal’s decision to be read as though it were a statute. Decisions must be understood in the context of the issues known to the parties. It was inappropriate to use a fine-toothcomb approach, as stated in Staffordshire County Council v J & J [1996] ELR 418.
4. Relief and costs. The appeal was allowed only in relation to occupational therapy. The authority was directed to obtain an up-to-date occupational therapy assessment and ensure that Part 3 contained current provision, with the concurrence of the tribunal chairman and members. No further relief was granted. The claimant received half her costs, with the recoverable fees reduced on assessment.

• Special Educational Needs and Disability Tribunal: SENDIST amended L’s statement but continued to name Peacehaven School in Part 4.
• High Court (Administrative Court): The appeal was allowed in part. The statement was held defective as to occupational therapy, but the challenge concerning speech and language therapy was dismissed.