Jp v Jrp

Under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989, property settlement and property transfer orders are alternative forms of a single, once-and-for-all property adjustment. Once one such order has been made against a parent for the same child, the court cannot make another property adjustment order of either kind.

A further lump sum remains legally available, but it cannot be used to enlarge or vary an existing property settlement, provide a repayable housing fund, or circumvent the statutory prohibition on a second property adjustment order. Lump sums ordinarily meet a child’s needs during dependency and education, rather than endowing the child beyond dependency.

The applicant mother sought further financial provision for her daughter under Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989. Earlier proceedings had resulted in a property settlement providing accommodation for the mother and child, together with lump-sum provision. The mother now sought, among other relief, a further property settlement, a transfer of property order, and a substantial lump sum to upgrade the accommodation.

The court considered whether the earlier settlement barred both forms of further property adjustment and whether the housing claim could proceed indirectly through a further lump sum. The hearing was a case-management hearing addressing jurisdiction and the legal viability of those claims.

1. The application for a further settlement of property was inadmissible. Paragraph 1(5)(b) of Schedule 1 to the Children Act 1989 prevents more than one settlement or transfer of property order against the same person in respect of the same child.

2. The statutory reference to exercising the powers “at any time” concerns the timing of an otherwise available application. It does not override the specific prohibition on a further property adjustment order.

3. Settlement and transfer orders are different methods of achieving the same once-and-for-all property adjustment. The legislative history confirmed that Parliament intended them to be alternatives. Because a transfer to the applicant for the child’s benefit would result in a trust, and a transfer to the child would likewise create a trust, the proposed transfer order was also barred.

4. The court had jurisdiction to make a further lump sum order. That jurisdiction could not, however, be used to finance an upgraded home in circumstances where the property adjustment claims were barred. A lump sum is ordinarily paid once and for all to meet past, present or future needs of a child during dependency and education. It is not designed to revert to the payer or operate as a repayable loan.

5. Using a conditional lump sum, or merging further money into the existing settlement, would be tantamount to varying or making a second property settlement. That would circumvent paragraph 1(5)(b) and was impermissible. The housing-related lump sum claim was therefore ruled out, while the remaining financial claims were directed to proceed.

6. The mother’s application for the further settlement and transfer orders was dismissed, and her attempt to obtain the housing fund through a further lump sum failed as a matter of law. She was ordered to pay the father’s standard-basis costs of and incidental to the hearing, enforcement being stayed without leave.