Kumar, R (on the application of) v Secretary of State for Constitutional Affairs

Decisions made by a county court or by the High Court sitting in a District Registry must be challenged by appeal through the appropriate appellate route. Judicial review is unavailable as an alternative route, including where rights under the Human Rights Act 1998 are invoked.

A general civil restraint order is justified where repeated claims demonstrate persistent vexatious conduct and impose inconvenience, harassment and expense out of proportion to any likely benefit. An extended order may be inadequate where litigation is pursued indiscriminately.

The claimant renewed an application for permission to seek judicial review of several decisions made at the Leicester District Registry of the Queen’s Bench Division. He also sought to prevent a forthcoming hearing and relied on rights under the Human Rights Act 1998.

Permission had been refused on the papers by Munby J as an abuse of process. The Secretary of State applied for a general civil restraint order, alternatively an extended civil restraint order, relying on Bhamjee v Forsdick [2003] EWCA Civ 1113.

1. Permission to apply for judicial review was refused. The proper remedy against a decision of a county court or of the High Court in a District Registry was an appeal to the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal, subject to any necessary permission. Judicial review could not be used instead, whether the asserted cause of action arose under the Human Rights Act 1998 or otherwise.

2. The claimant’s previous proceedings demonstrated persistent vexatious behaviour. They had no realistic prospect of producing a benefit and were designed to cause inconvenience, harassment and expense to defendants out of proportion to any likely gain.

3. Applying the principles in Bhamjee v Forsdick [2003] EWCA Civ 1113, an extended civil restraint order was unrealistic because of the claimant’s scattergun approach. A general civil restraint order was necessary.

4. A general civil restraint order was made for a period not exceeding two years, prohibiting the claimant from instituting proceedings or applications in the High Court or any county court without permission from Mr Justice Moses or Collins J.