Islington London Borough Council v First Secretary of State

An inspector’s planning judgment must be read as a whole. An inspector may consider comparable developments elsewhere when assessing whether a proposal is appropriate in its streetscape, provided the judgment remains directed to the particular proposal and its surroundings. Detailed reasons are unnecessary for a planning judgment once the relevant context and impacts have been adequately explained. For a planning costs award, the guidance requires a conclusion that reasonable conduct would have resulted in permission being granted and the appeal being avoided. An isolated use of the lesser possibility that the outcome might have differed does not invalidate the decision if the inspector’s decision, read as a whole, applies the correct test and the error is immaterial.

Two linked challenges concerned an inspector’s decisions dated 1 August 2003. The first was a claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 challenging permission for a roof extension at 58 Canning Road, London. The second was a judicial review claim challenging an award of appeal costs against the Council.

The Council argued that the inspector had relied on irrelevant examples of modern developments elsewhere and had failed adequately to explain his conclusion on the proposal’s effect on its particular surroundings. It also argued that the costs decision applied the wrong test under paragraph 27 of Annex 3 to Circular 8/93. The central issues were whether the planning decision was legally flawed and whether the costs decision was vitiated by error of law.

1. Planning permission. The claim under section 288 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1990 was dismissed. The inspector was entitled to consider examples of modern buildings and roof extensions elsewhere in the borough. Such evidence could inform the judgment whether the proposal was appropriate in the streetscape. The inspector nevertheless made a judgment about the particular proposal in its particular surroundings.
2. The decision had to be read as a whole by a well-informed reader aware of the principal controversy. The inspector had described the surrounding area and the proposal’s visibility and prominence from different perspectives. His conclusion that the proposal was appropriate, respected the scale, form and character of its surroundings, and related positively to existing buildings was a planning judgment which required no more elaborate reasoning.
3. Costs award. Permission for judicial review was granted, but the substantive claim was dismissed. Paragraph 27 of Annex 3 required the inspector to conclude that a more helpful approach by the Council would have enabled the appeal to be avoided. In substance, that required a conclusion that permission would have been granted, or should have been granted by a reasonable authority, if the application had been handled properly.
4. The inspector incorrectly used language suggesting that a different outcome merely might have resulted. However, he stated the correct approach at the beginning and end of his decision. Read as a whole, paragraph 12 constituted his final conclusion that permission would have been granted, or should have been granted, following reasonable conduct. The error in paragraph 9 was therefore immaterial and did not vitiate the decision.
5. The court accepted the general principles in R v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte London Borough of Ealing [1999] EWHC Admin 345 concerning the discretionary nature of inspectors’ costs awards and the rarity and proportionality of judicial intervention. In the circumstances, those considerations did not prevent permission being granted and the claim being determined substantively.
6. The Council was ordered to pay the Secretary of State’s costs of both claims, summarily assessed at £5,514.

The judgment describes two challenges to decisions made by a planning inspector on 1 August 2003. The High Court dismissed the section 288 claim, granted permission for judicial review of the costs decision, and dismissed that substantive claim.