Hiscox Underwriting Ltd & Anor v Dickson Manchester & Co Ltd & Anor

An agent’s records concerning business written for its principal belong to the principal, including correspondence identifying producing brokers. An express inspection clause may reinforce that right. Where related disputes are subject to arbitration, the court may grant interim relief under the Arbitration Act 1996 where urgency exists and the tribunal cannot act effectively. The jurisdiction is exercised minimally and should support, rather than determine, the arbitral process. An injunction may nevertheless be granted where delay would cause irreparable commercial loss and damages would be inadequate. The court should preserve the position pending arbitration by making the narrowest effective order.

Hiscox sought urgent access to records held by its underwriting agents, Dickson Manchester, under a binding authority agreement. The records included policy documents, risk lists and correspondence identifying producing brokers. Dickson Manchester resisted disclosure, principally on confidentiality and alleged restrictions on Hiscox competing for the business.

The agreement contained an inspection clause and an arbitration clause. Hiscox sought interim relief before the arbitrator could act, while renewals were falling due and the binding authority was approaching termination. The issues were whether the court had jurisdiction to grant the order and, if so, whether urgency and the balance of convenience justified intervention.

1. Access to agency records. Documents relating to risks written under the binding authority were part of the agency business conducted for Hiscox. Under ordinary agency principles, and independently under clause 15, the documents belonged to Hiscox and could be inspected and copied. This included information identifying producing brokers.
2. Jurisdiction. Section 44.2(e) of the Arbitration Act 1996 conferred a general power to grant an interim injunction. The power was constrained by sections 44(4) and 44(5), requiring urgency where applicable and intervention only where the tribunal could not act effectively. Section 44(3) was permissive and did not exhaust or define the court’s power under section 44.2(e).
3. The court’s approach under section 1(c) of the Act was properly minimalist. The court could also rely, in exceptional circumstances, on its residual jurisdiction under section 37 of the Supreme Court Act and its inherent jurisdiction. The authorities, including Vale do Rio v Shanghai Bao Steel [2000] 2 Lloyds Rep 1, supported the distinction between the court’s power to intervene and an absolute prohibition on intervention.
4. An interim injunction should not ordinarily determine the dispute reserved for arbitration or usurp the arbitrator’s function. That consideration yielded where urgency and fairness required temporary protection. Here, renewals were occurring continually, Hiscox lacked access to the brokers, damages would be difficult to quantify, and Dickson Manchester had delayed effective arbitral intervention.
5. The balance of convenience favoured limited relief. The court ordered access to records for risks already due for renewal and risks becoming due before the arbitrator’s award. The arbitrator could later vary or reconsider the order under section 44(6).

First-instance decision. No prior or subsequent appellate decision is stated in the judgment.