Council for the Regulation of Health Care Professionals v General Medical Council & Anor

Section 29 of the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002 permits the Council to refer an acquittal by a professional disciplinary body where the statutory conditions are met. A final decision not to impose a disciplinary measure includes an ultimate conclusion that the practitioner was not guilty of serious professional misconduct. The Council may make that reference after the relevant disciplinary proceedings have ended, even if an unrelated allegation or separate proceedings concerning the practitioner remain outstanding. The statutory scheme preserves the professional body’s control while its investigation or proceedings continue, but provides a public-protection longstop thereafter. The referral power is discretionary, and the court must prevent abuse and intervene only in appropriate cases.

The Council referred the Professional Conduct Committee’s decision acquitting a medical practitioner of serious professional misconduct. The Council sought to challenge the decision under section 29 of the National Health Service Reform and Health Care Professions Act 2002.

The preliminary issues were whether an acquittal could constitute a relevant decision capable of referral, and whether referral was barred while the General Medical Council investigated an additional allegation that might lead to further disciplinary proceedings. The merits of the proposed referral were not determined.

1. Acquittals. The court held that section 29(2)(a) covers a final decision not to take a disciplinary measure, whatever form the ultimate conclusion of the disciplinary process takes. In context, that includes an acquittal of serious professional misconduct. Section 29(4)(a), which refers to an unduly lenient finding or lack of a finding, confirms that the statutory power can engage questions of liability as well as penalty.
2. Construction and purpose. The wider statutory scheme balances the Council’s broad public-protection functions with the independence of the relevant professional body during an investigation or disciplinary process. A construction preventing review of an acquittal merely because no other misconduct finding existed would create an artificial and incoherent distinction and would frustrate the protective purpose of the legislation.
3. Outstanding matters. Section 26(3) prevents the Council from intervening in the particular case while the professional body’s investigative or disciplinary process is under way. Section 26(4), however, permits action under section 29 after the regulatory body’s proceedings in that case have ended. It does not require the Council to await unrelated investigations or proceedings concerning the same practitioner. The four-week limit in section 29(6) supports that construction.
4. Safeguard. The referral power is discretionary. The court must ensure that the process is not abused and that intervention occurs only in appropriate cases, applying stringent control comparable to that used in references of unduly lenient criminal sentences.
5. Disposition. Both preliminary issues were decided for the Council. The Council could refer the acquittal and was not required to await the GMC’s ongoing investigation. The matter was to proceed to a hearing on the merits, with directions to be addressed subsequently.