A (A Child), R (on the application of) v Leeds Magistrate's Court & Anor

Judicial review is generally unsuitable for challenging an interim anti-social behaviour order where statutory appeal routes provide a more effective remedy. The primary routes are an application to vary or discharge the order, an appeal to the Crown Court, or, where appropriate, an appeal by way of case stated. Judicial review remains available for matters such as procedural unfairness or bias, but substantive disagreement with the legal assessment is ordinarily better addressed on appeal. In deciding whether an interim order concerning a child is just, the child’s best interests are a primary consideration, but so are the interests of the public. The interests of the child are not automatically decisive, and failure to use a particular formula does not invalidate the order where the principle was substantively considered.

The claimant, a child aged 16, sought permission to challenge by judicial review two interim anti-social behaviour orders made by Leeds Magistrates’ Court under section 1D of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, as amended by the Police Reform Act 2002. The orders had been obtained by Leeds City Council and restricted conduct associated with serious anti-social behaviour and drug activity.

He argued that the District Judge had failed to treat his best interests as a primary consideration when making and renewing the orders. The court also considered delay and the availability of alternative remedies, including appeal to the Crown Court and appeal by way of case stated.

1. Outcome. Permission to apply for judicial review of both interim orders was refused. The first order was independently defeated by delay. The second order was unsuitable for judicial review because adequate statutory and appellate remedies were available. The substantive challenge would also have failed.
2. Delay. Promptness is required even where proceedings are commenced within the period in CPR Part 54.5. Delay is especially significant for an ASBO because it must be obeyed unless set aside or discharged, and delay may prejudice effective public protection and good administration under section 31(6) of the Supreme Court Act 1981.
3. Alternative remedies. The principal routes for challenging an interim ASBO are an application to the magistrates’ court to discharge or vary it, opposition to a further interim or full order, appeal to the Crown Court under section 4 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, and, where appropriate, appeal by way of case stated. Judicial review is not normally appropriate where the complaint is that the magistrates’ court applied the wrong substantive test, because the High Court cannot ordinarily reconsider the evidence, substitute its discretion, or vary the order. The supervisory jurisdiction recognised in R v Hereford Magistrates Court, ex p Rowlands [1998] QB 10 remains important for procedural unfairness and bias.
4. Children’s interests. In deciding whether it is just to make or renew an interim ASBO against a child, the child’s best interests must be treated as a primary consideration. They are not the primary consideration to the exclusion of the public interest. The District Judge had read the relevant judgment, expressly considered the claimant’s age and best interests, and carried out the necessary balancing exercise. The evidence therefore did not establish an error of law.
5. A child relying on special interests to resist an ASBO, or to seek different prohibitions, must provide an explanation and relevant evidence of the prejudice relied upon. The statutory phrase concerning the child’s best interests is not a magic formula whose omission necessarily invalidates an order.

not stated in the judgment.