Minani, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appeal Tribunal

In an asylum appeal, an adjudicator must distinguish between the truth of an applicant’s account and the existence or diagnosis of a medical condition said to result from it. A diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder cannot be rejected merely because the applicant’s account is disbelieved. Medical evidence must be assessed critically and in the context of the evidence as a whole. However, an error concerning the diagnosis will not justify quashing a decision where the credibility finding rests on ample independent reasons and the medical evidence would not materially affect the outcome.

The claimant, a minor from Burundi, sought asylum after alleging that rebels had attacked her village, killed her parents and raped her. The Secretary of State refused her claim. An adjudicator dismissed her appeal, relying on material discrepancies in her account, her knowledge of English, the circumstances of her journey and other credibility concerns. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal refused permission to appeal.

On judicial review, the claimant challenged the treatment of interpretation complaints, supporting evidence including a birth certificate, and medical evidence diagnosing post-traumatic stress disorder. The central issue was whether the adjudicator had erred in law and, if so, whether the error justified quashing the decision.

1. The application was dismissed. The adjudicator was entitled to find that the claimant’s account had materially changed concerning where money had been hidden and what item she had carried or handed to the agent. The Immigration Appeal Tribunal was entitled to uphold that conclusion, particularly since the interview record had been signed by the claimant and her legal representative.
2. The adjudicator was also entitled to assess the birth certificate and the report concerning the claimant’s nationality in the context of the evidence as a whole. Even if the birth certificate were genuine, it did not establish the asylum claim, because the central question was whether the claimant’s account was truthful.
3. The adjudicator erred in his treatment of the psychiatric evidence. He appeared to reason that the diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder was correct only if the claimant’s account was true, and incorrect if it was false. That was an impermissible conflation. The diagnosis and the truth of the account were separate matters. It was also wrong to assume that an expert psychiatrist had accepted the claimant’s account uncritically merely because the report was based on information supplied by her.
4. The error was not determinative. Reading the adjudicator’s decision as a whole, the issue was whether the account was truthful, not simply whether the claimant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder. The credibility finding rested on numerous substantial matters, including discrepancies, the claimant’s remarkable knowledge of English, the asserted journey after the rape and the conduct of the alleged agent. The medical evidence was a factor in the claimant’s favour, but did not require the adjudicator to disregard those matters.
5. The assessment of the medical evidence in the context of the evidence as a whole was a matter for the adjudicator. The decision therefore was not quashed. Costs were not to be enforced without leave of the court, subject to production of the legal-aid certificate and assessment.

The judgment records the following prior procedural history:

• Secretary of State: refused the claimant’s asylum claim.
• Adjudicator: dismissed the claimant’s appeal.
• Immigration Appeal Tribunal: refused permission to appeal.
• High Court (Administrative Court): dismissed the judicial review application.